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As a result of substantial efforts by the governments and citizens in the former socialist 
countries, the shift to a market economy is now entering its second phase. If the first phase of 
the transition was to constitute the social and economic institutions that are vital for 
establishing a ‘minimum’ system of market economy, then the present aim should be to 
enhance these hastily introduced institutions for further development of capitalism. 
This is also the case with the corporate system. There is no country in the former 
Soviet Union or Central and Eastern Europe that does not have secured legal freedom of 
private ownership, labor contracts, profit distribution and business competition. Despite being 
in the early stages of developing a market economy, most of these countries have laid the 
groundwork for their banking system, securities markets, accounting systems and bankruptcy 
procedures. Thus, in a number of countries where the formal institutional framework has been 
established and private businesses have begun to lead production activities, the focus of policy 
debate has shifted from ‘traditional’ measures for the economic transformation such as 
privatization of state-owned enterprises to how to shape the existing business firms including 
their organizational architecture and the governance mechanism. 
From this point of view, we are now conducting investigation into corporate 
governance issues in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe together with 
foreign scholars in the framework of a joint research project supported by the Institute of 
Economic Research of Hitotsubashi University and the Ministry of Education and Science of 
Japan. This book represents one of outcomes from the project and touches upon the mechanism 
of corporate governance in Hungary. I wish it could expand knowledge of readers in the field 
of corporate governance in transition economies and make a contribution to the development 
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Corporate Governance in Hungary: An Overview 
Éva Ozsvald 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the Hungarian corporate governance system, the features 
of the Budapest Stock Exchange and the ownership structure of listed companies. The 
corporate governance system is largely based on the continental type European model and 
related regulations follow the directives of the European Union. While laws and regulations 
match those in the developed market economies of Europe, the implementation and the 
enforcement of laws lag behind. The corporate governance system is in close connection with 
the external financing of companies which is considered to be still a weak point of the 
Hungarian economy. 
JEL Classification Numbers: G 32, G34, K 22 
 
Chapter 2 
Foreign Direct Investment and Corporate Restructuring in Hungary 
Ichiro Iwasaki 
 
Large-scale foreign direct investment and intensive business activities by multinational companies 
have played a crucial role in Hungary’s transition to a market economy. The massive inflow of 
foreign capital has supported the macro-economy by spurring effective demand, contributing 
substantially to its long-lasting and stable economic growth, as well as to drastic changes in the 
corporate sector through the conversion of ownership structure, improvements in production 
system, strengthening market competitiveness, modernization of management systems, and 
revitalization of R&D and innovation activities. In spite of all this, Hungary still has many 
problems with corporate restructuring. The Hungarian government and the business sector are now 
at a turning point in their passive strategy of economic transformation. 




The Characteristics of Corporate Capital Structure Decisions during 
the Transition Period in Hungary 
Iván Bélyácz 
 
This chapter analyzes the characteristics of corporate capital structure decisions through the 
example of the Hungarian transition period. The first part introduces the theoretical 
background for capital structure decisions, highlighting the trade-off theory, the pecking order 
theory and the agency theory. The second part of the study concentrates on the capital structure 
decisions in emerging market economies during the transition period. The last part covers the 
specific features for capital structure decisions based on Hungarian experiences during the 
period between 1992 and 2001, using the examples of manufacturing industry. The author’s 
main conclusion is that the assets versus liabilities maturity matching principle is violated by 
the prevailing permanent component of short term liabilities applied in the long run, affecting 
masses of companies, which can have disadvantageous impact on the corporate liquidity and 
growth potential. 
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The lesson from the 1997 Asian financial crisis and a number of high profile corporate 
scandals on the both sides of the Atlantic in 2001-2002 has been well learnt: strong corporate 
governance (CG) standards – the main elements of which are improved disclosure, 
strengthened shareholders rights and more independent supervisory boards - must be built up 
if a company wants to become attractive for outside investors. According to a survey 
conducted by McKinsey and Company (Global Investor Opinion Survey, 2002)
1, good 
corporate governance has become a key investment criterion, on a par with the financial 
characteristics of the given firm. Doubts about the quality of CG can easily drive investors to 
avoid companies or even countries. It is also not by chance that analysis which rate 
companies and countries according to the level of their standards of CG have appeared 
recently. The very existence of the rating is a proof of the increased importance of factors 
that constitute CG. In a sense the assessment of CG risk can be used as a proxy for the 
description of general business environment. In addition, international institutions such as the 
IMF, World Bank, OECD, all show interest in establishing and promoting best practices of 
CG.  
                                                      
1  The survey was based on the responses of 200 institutional investors from all over the world 
representing about $ 2 trillion assets under management. Chapter 1 
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Hungary and Hungarian companies are affected as well. Hungary is small, middle-
income economy with a remarkable degree of integration into the world economy. The 
country’s savings, however, are not sufficient for a catching-up growth, thus, it must fiercely 
compete for foreign direct investment. Under these conditions it is obvious that she cannot 
risk the divergence with international trends. She has no choice but follow international 
standards in all important fields - including up-dated CG practices. Being a member of the 
European Union since 1 May 2004 she has to adjust to the European benchmark in the first 
place. Thus, new CG legal regulations and codes of conduct have been imported from the 
European Union extensively. 
Both a successfully completed transition from plan to market and the accession to the 
EU would have been impossible without creating a proper legal environment. Hungary’s 
accomplishments in this field are unanimously acknowledged. There is, however, a gap 
between laws on the books (law extensiveness) on the one hand, and law enforcement (law 
effectiveness) and the real working of the economy on the other. This is a general 
phenomenon in emerging market economies (as discussed by Berglöf & Claessens, 2004) and 
should be kept in mind when the issues of CG are analysed.
2    Based on the analysis of 
several dozens countries world-wide, LLSV (1999) drew the conclusion that unlike legal 
rules themselves, which do not appear to depend on the level of economic development, the 
quality of enforcement is sharply higher in richer countries. There is also a positive 
correlation between the level of development and the strength and quality of financial 
intermediation.  
To keep our analysis focused we chose the following issues directly related to CG to 
be examined in this paper:  legal arrangements and formal CG structures; the weight of and 
the way stock market functions in Hungary; the ownership structure of listed companies and 
minority shareholders protection.  
 
                                                      
2  Referring to a number of empirical research, authors arrive at a conclusion that the “enforcement 
of the rule of law is a, perhaps the, central functional difference between developed market 
economies and developing economies.” (Berglöf & Claessens, 2004) Chapter 1 
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1.2 Legal Arrangements - Formal CG Structures 
Hungary, like most of other continental European countries, has a civil law system rather 
than the common law system that is used in Great Britain and the United States. Within this, 
Hungarian corporate law belongs to the German-type group, similarly to that in other Central 
Eastern European countries. 
Act 144 of 1997 on Business Associations (the Company Act)
3 regulates  the 
foundation, organization and operation of business associations with a registered office in 
Hungary and the rights, obligations and responsibility of the founders and members 
(shareholders) of business associations. Business associations with legal personality are: joint 
enterprises, limited liability companies (‘Kft’) and companies limited by shares (‘Rt’) or joint 
stock corporations with another name. The two latter, ‘Kft’-s and ‘Rt’-s are the most frequent 
forms of companies in Hungary. According to the Central Statistical Office,  176,973 limited 
liability companies and 3,751 companies limited by shares operated in the country in 2003. 
Only a company limited by shares may issue securities representing ownership in the 
company.  These companies are either closed or public, the former being established through 
a private placement, while the shares of public companies are wholly or partially traded on 
the stock exchange. 
All companies registered in Hungary are under the Court of Registration’s legal 
supervision. The Court maintains the company register and provides public access to 
company information. 
The CG structure of companies is based on the board system, similar to the German 
two-tier model with a supervisory board (dealing with the strategic direction of the company 
                                                      
3  In June 1998 a new version of the law took effect, containing formal but also important 
modifications, such as raising minimum capital requirements and giving supervisory boards 
limited decision making power. The latest version came in 2003 when the Hungarian Parliament 
has approved substantial amendments to the Companies Act as part of the harmonization of 
Hungarian company law with EU requirements. Most of the changes relate to companies limited 
by shares. Chapter 1 
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and the monitoring of the management) and a management board (carrying out the 
operational management of the company). 
In case of limited liabilities companies the supreme body is the member’s meeting or 
general assembly which must be convened at least once a year. The members approve the 
company report and take decisions on issues such as the appropriation of after-tax profits, 
election and removal of the managing director, supervisory board members and the auditor, 
alteration of the articles of association etc. The members’ meeting has quorum if at least half 
of the initial capital or the majority of the eligible votes are present and resolutions are passed 
by a simple majority of votes.  
The supervisory board monitors the management of the limited liabilities companies 
for the members' meeting. As prescribed by law, Kft.-s must have a supervisory board only 
above a certain size: in cases when the initial capital of the company is above HUF 50 million 
and/or the number of full-time employees exceeds 200 persons. Election of an auditor is 
obligatory for a Kft. in the case of single-man company or if the capital exceeds HUF 50 
million. 
When a company limited by shares, an Rt. is founded, the initial cash contribution of 
each member is much higher than in the case Kft.s.  Shares in Rt. can be of various types and 
different types embody different ownership rights. Companies may issue ordinary, preferred, 
employee, and interest-bearing shares. Preferred shares (which include the ‘golden’ share of 
the state) may be issued up to 50 percent of registered capital.  
The Annual General Meeting (AMG) has authority over key decisions. The most 
important exclusive rights of the AMG are: 
 
- Creation and modification of the statute (75% + 1 vote); 
- Decision on the modification of the legal form (75% + 1 vote); 
- Decision on the transformation or termination without legal successor of the company 
(75% + 1 vote); 
- Election and removal of the members of the Management Board, the Supervisory Board        
and the auditors, decision on their remuneration; 
- Decision on the transformation of share type; Chapter 1 
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- Acquisition of own shares, acceptance of the public offer for the company's own shares 
(Earle, Kucsera, & Telegdy, 2001). 
 
The Board of Directors of an Rt. is the executive body of the company. The Board 
represents the company vis- a –vis third parties and before the authorities. The Board of 
Directors is also responsible for supervising the working organisation of the Rt. and it 
exercises the rights of employer. In the case of companies limited by shares it is obligatory to 
establish a Supervisory Board and to have an auditor.  
As far as the formal CG structures that follow the rules established by law are 
concerned we can conclude that they closely resemble the pattern established in continental 
Europe. While the form is much in order, there is a number of inadequacies when the content 
is explored. A few empirical analyses, such as the one carried out by Adam Torok and his 
team (Torok, 1998) drew attention to this fact. In case of limited liabilities companies the 
author saw the lack of transparency and the ‘façade-like’ CG structures as a typical 
phenomenon. The explanation for this is that the majority of Hungarian Kfts-s are controlled 
by one or a few very strong owners. When ownership and control is not separated, the agent-
principal problem is non-existent. In companies in which owners and the members of the 
management are identical can be run efficiently in spite of weakly functioning CG structures. 
Analysing the CG structures of joint stock companies, Torok (1998) arrives at a 
conclusion that supervisory boards  hardly  have any ‘teeth’ at all and the Board of Directors 
do not depend on them in any respect.  The real role of supervisory board is limited to 
monitoring the conformity of the company’s functioning with the law and to some other 
purely formal tasks. 
The World Bank Report (ROSC, 2003) which benchmarks Hungary’s practice of CG 
against the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (see Appendix) also finds the role of 
supervisory board fairly weak, pointing out that its main power is to refer issues to the 
general meeting of shareholders. In fact, the general weakness of supervisory board was the 
main shortcoming among just a few that the Report established when Hungary’s observance 
of CG standards and codes were evaluated. (The second was the conflict between law and 
practice in the area of share registration.)  It should be stressed here that the overall Chapter 1 
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assessment of the Report on the legislative and regulatory framework of CG in Hungary was 
positive. 
Besides the Company Act the other basic law affecting listed companies is the 
Capital Markets Act (CMA) enacted January 1, 2002. It governs all activities, products and 
institutions related to capital markets (except for insurance company and pension fund 
regulations). The Capital Markets Act was born out of a thorough legislative reform the main 
aim of which was to bring Hungarian legislation in line with EU laws.  
The capital markets supervisor is the Hungarian Financial Services Authority (HFSA), 
an independent and self-financing body. Created in April 2000, it is modelled on the FSA in 
the UK and it oversees every sector of the financial and securities markets (ROSC, 2003).  
Finally, in 2003 the Budapest Stock Exchange has adopted detailed recommendations 
and rules regarding CG issues for the listed companies. A basic goal was to assure that 
investors receive adequate information about the corporation and its activities so that may 
make investment decisions and exercise shareholder rights appropriately. 
 
1.3 The Capital Market 
The countries of Central Eastern Europe are not a particular variety of economic systems 
called ‘transition economy’ any more:  they function and have institutions like ‘normal’ 
market economies A few deficiencies, however remain and among these it is the relatively 
low degree of financial intermediation which we think is one of the their major weaknesses 
and which is shared by Hungary as well. Another feature is the dominance of the banking 
sector over capital markets, which, however, does not imply that credit markets are 
sufficiently developed in CEEs.  In this respect, Hungary is doing relatively well compared to 
other CCEs with loans extended to the corporate sector being around 25% of GDP (2000) – 
this share, is, however, below the EU average. Capital markets are very modest in Hungary, 
they compare unfavourably not only with the EU bourses but even with the Polish stock 
market.  Chapter 1 
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The Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) was first established in 1864 and it operated 
until 1948. Under the system of central planning it ceased to function but was re-opened in 
June, almost as soon as the transition to a market economy started. 
In the beginning there were only 6 listed companies on the BSE.  By 1999 this 
number reached 64 companies: this was the year with most listed companies so far (Table 1). 
As of August 2002 the Budapest Stock Exchange listed 50 firms – 24 as Category ‘A’ and 26 
as Category ‘B’.  Of this only ‘A’ which has higher listing requirement is important, since it 
represents 93 percent of market capitalization. The three largest Hungarian companies – 
Matav (telecommunications), Mol (oil industry), and OTP (banking) - account for 66 percent 
of the market capitalization of the BSE. Cross-listing is typical: domestic firms which are 
large enough and have a sufficient track record to borrow on the capital market are also listed 
on bourses abroad. The above mentioned companies e.g. are listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. The growing importance of cross-listings is the sign of: (1) capital requirements of 
large companies cannot be satisfied on the local market, and (2) these companies are ready to 
meet the high CG requirements of the renowned foreign stock exchanges. 
The trend on the BSE is not promising:  the number of new listings tends to decrease, 
while that of the delisting to increase. The stock exchange remains relatively unimportant for 
the economy as it is indicated by the relation of the market capitalization to the GDP. It 
reached its peak at 35.9 percent in 1999, then fell to 26.1 percent at the end of 2000. 
This degree of market capitalization has several explanations among which the most 
frequently cited are feeble income levels and low level of institutional savings (those of 
pension funds and insurance companies). As far as the size of the firms on the BSE is 
concerned they are mostly large firms in Hungarian measure: the average firm had around 
2000 employees between 1996 and 2000. For medium-size companies, going public is not 
attractive: they find the listing expensive and the rules too demanding. 
In sectoral break-down most listed firms belong to manufacturing (40 percent), 
approximately 20 percent are in utilities, 10 percent in banking and finance, and the 
remainder in various other services. (Earle, Kucsera, & Telegdy, 2004) 
Who are the main owners of stocks on the BSE?  In 2001 foreign investors accounted for 
more than 70 percent of the market capitalization. The government held 8.5%, and non-Chapter 1 
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financial corporations, retail investors and the financial sector had roughly the same share, 
around 6 percent each. Interestingly, banks are not players on the BSE, with the exception of 
the year 2000 when one company had a bank as a blockholder.  
However small the Budapest Stock Exchange is, it is the most frequently used 
starting point for the analysis of the characteristics of the Hungarian corporate governance 
practices. It is very difficult to get systematic information on unlisted companies, while those 
on the stock exchange have to provide that on a regular basis. We must note that compared to 
the economy as a whole, CG standards of firms present on the BSE is much higher: if only 
for the strict listing requirements and for  the code of conducts  the stock exchange prescribes, 
with the consequences of eventual punishment.  
 
1.4 High Ownership Concentration 
There are two basic models of ownership concentration: ‘blockholder dominated 
corporations’ and ‘widely held corporation’. The majority of firms listed on the BSE clearly 
fit in the first category and with this characteristics Hungary is by no means an outlier:   
concentrated ownership (even in public companies) is a rule in most countries of the world.  
Widely held firms are frequent only on the bourses of US and UK. 
Explained by the logic of the mainstream theory on CG, the dominance of large 
blockholders follows from the nature of the legal system and law enforcement mechanisms. 
Although Hungary was not included in the famous ‘LLSV’ (1999) empirical survey, it 
nevertheless, belongs to the continental European legal family which protects investors less 
than the Anglo-Saxon system, thus a strong controlling shareholder is needed to monitor 
effectively the management of the company. 
The origins of high ownership concentration are dealt with differently in the post-
socialist transition literature, where the experts attach key importance to the chosen way of 
privatization. This in case of Hungary in the early phase of transition was insider’s buy-out 
and was followed by direct sales to strategic investors, with openness to foreign investors. 
High ownership concentration has both advantages and costs for the firm and for the 
society. In a transition country when restructuring of formerly state-owned enterprises is of Chapter 1 
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crucial importance, we have every reason to believe that it is carried out faster and more 
efficiently when owners are few and strong than the case would be with widely dispersed 
ownership patterns. More generally, the merits of ownership concentration are the potentially 
better and less costly corporate control and the reduced possibility of diverging interests 
between the management and the owners of the company. The costs on the company level, on 
the other hand are limited risk diversification, lower liquidity and as a result, less external 
financing. From CG point of view, concentrated ownership undermines the independence of 
boards, eliminates such tools of market discipline as the threat of takeovers and the market 
for corporate control and increases the likelihood of minority rights expropriation.  
Earle, Kucsera, & Telegdy (2001; 2004) using company data presented a detailed 
analysis of the ownership structure of firms listed on the BSE (Table 2).  They found that the 
total holding of blockholders (defined as owners having at least five percent of the voting 
shares) fluctuated around the median of 65-76 percent between 1996-2000. There was a large 
interfirm variation: some firms were owned totally by blockholders (the maximum is very 
close to 100 percent), while in the case of others, the ownership was quite dispersed.  The 
number of firms without blockholders, however, has declined from 11.4 percent to 6 percent 
of the total between 1996 and 2000, while the ratio of firms with the total blockholding over 
50 percent has increased. In international comparison there is nothing particular about having 
one weighty blockholder, since with the exception of the Netherlands, all EU countries have a 
higher share of companies with over 50 percent of total blockholdings.  The authors drew 
attention to significance multiple blockholding in the Hungarian case, when the second and 
third big owners have also a substantial voting power in the firm.  
As a sample of large companies which includes also those outside the BSE (with 
reservations about the quality of data) shows, a high degree of concentration of ownership is 
a characteristic feature of the Hungarian economy (Table 3). 
 
1.5 The Protection of Minority Shareholders 
When the ownership of the company is dominated by large blockholders – as it is the 
Hungarian case described above - there are chances that the controlling owners of the Chapter 1 
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company would enjoy private benefits at the expense of small shareholders. Thus, the 
presence of the large blockholders in listed companies puts minority rights on a top place 
among CG issues. 
World Bank experts when evaluating the Hungarian practice of the protection of non-
controlling shareowners in the light of requirements put forward by the OECD Principles of 
CG - “the corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders” - find that this condition is “largely observed”.  Yet, Hungary does not follow 
the ‘one-share- one vote’ principle; this is why it is recommended for policymakers to move 
further toward this principle by phasing out ‘golden shares’ 
4 and veto shares and removing 
the possibility for issuance of preferred shares with multiple voting rights. Procedures to 
make voting easy for shareholders are also expected to be improved. 
Transparency about the company’s affairs is of utmost interest for small shareholders 
and institutional investors who often represent them.  Therefore, a strong disclosure regime is 
essential for the exercise of shareholders’ right. According to the OECD Principles of CG, 
“Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to obtain a degree of 
control disproportionate to their equity ownership should be disclosed.” 
Hungary was somewhat late in the introduction of this rule but since July 2001 
shareholders have primary responsibility for disclosing ownership details to the company and 
HFSA if their holding exceed certain limits. Disclosure thresholds are the five percent and 
multiples thereof up to 50, 75, and 90 percent. Issuers must disclose their ownership structure 
in flash and annual reports. The Capital Market Act requires nominees/custodians to disclose 
ultimate owners. Cross-holdings are prohibited and shareholders agreements must be 
disclosed   (ROSC, 2003). 
 
1.6 Foreign Firms in Hungary 
Hungarian manufacturing, financial sector and services are dominated by subsidiaries of 
foreign enterprises. The penetration of foreign capital was the key to Hungary’s success of 
                                                      
4  ‘Golden shares’ were employed during the privatization of Hungarian state-owned enterprises to 
retain state control over major strategic decisions. Chapter 1 
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transition, modernising its economy and its outstanding performance. Table 4 shows the 
weight of foreign equities in selected branches, while in Table 5, the productivity indicators 
of foreign and domestic firms are compared. 
Multinational companies (MNCs) the subsidiaries of which operate in Hungary are 
not present in the Budapest Stock Exchange: they are listed on bourses of US, UK, Germany 
etc. Their CG behaviour is thus governed by the rules that prevail on those exchanges and 
also, of the national laws of the countries where the head office of the given MNC is located. 
While foreign subsidiaries have to comply with a range of important Hungarian laws, their 
CG related characteristics are certainly not a ‘Hungarian business’. 
If, however, CG is considered in its wider context, when cultural and value aspects  
of the given business environment are also taken into account, the demonstration effect that 
foreign firms present can be beneficial for the evolution of the behavioural norms of   
Hungarian companies. 
 
1.7 Concluding Remarks 
The Hungarian economy is dominated by foreign companies and domestic companies with 
strong owners who are either large blockholders or, in the case of medium size companies, 
the owner and the manager are often the same person. The main characteristics of the 
Hungarian CG are summarized in Table 5. The other typical feature of the Hungarian 
economy is the low level of external financing. Besides ownership concentration it is the 
underdevelopment of financial intermediation that explains why many aspects of CG remain 
just formality.  Thus, an improved CG in Hungary is still work in progress. The direction is 
determined by the EU membership5 and the country’s openness towards foreign capital. As 
the economy will grow, so will the importance of external finance with a positive feedback 
on CG. Once the reform of the social security system will be completed, the role of private 
pension funds and insurance companies on the capital markets will grow. (The process has 
                                                      
5  To cite but one example: EU regulations prescribe that publicly traded companies, governed by 
Hungarian laws must prepare their consolidated accounts in conformity with international 
accounting standards starting from January 1, 2005. Chapter 1 
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already started as it is demonstrated in Table 6.) The demand of stronger institutional 
investors will certainly contribute to better and more effective corporate governance in 
Hungary. Chapter 1 
  13
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I. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were agreed in 1999 and are intended to 
assist member and non-member governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the 
legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their countries, and 
to provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other 
parties that have a role in the process of developing good corporate governance. 
 
The Principles deal with five topics:  
 
I.   The Rights of Shareholders; 
II.  The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders; 
III. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance; 
IV. Disclosure and Transparency; 
V.  The Responsibility of the Board. Chapter 1 
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Note: O: Observed, PO: Partially observed, MO: Materially non-observed, NO: Non-observed. 
Source: ROSC (2003). Chapter 1
(a) Number of listed companies
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic 54 82 91 92 74 57 94
Hungary 42 44 47 53 64 58 57
Poland 65 83 143 198 221 225 230
(b) Market capitalization in % of GDP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic 20.0 26.7 24.4 19.3 22.6 19.2 16.2
 Hungary 5.8 12.2 35.2 29.4 35.9 26.1 19.8
 Poland 3.7 6.2 9.1 13.0 19.9 18.9 14.9
Note: In case of Hungary and Poland stocks traded on the unregulated free market are included.






39.4 19.4 0.0 42.2 87.1
52.9 23.1 0.0 55.9 99.9
57.7 23.7 0.0 62.9 99.4
60.9 24.6 0.0 67.2 99.4
13.5 9.7 0.0 14.7 42.5
4.8 5.1 0.0 3.9 22.7







Table 2. Ownership Concentration on the Budapest Stock
Exchange, 1996-2000























One 49 57 49 57
Two 1 1.2 1 1.2
Three 0000
Maximum 3 50 58.1 50 58.1
More than 3 36 41.9 16 18.6
Total 86 100 66 76.7
Source: Voszka (1999).












Manufacturing 4,012.2 1,157.8 5,170.0 77.6
Food, beverages and tobacco products 536.1 213.1 749.2 71.6
Textiles 66.2 46.4 112.6 58.8
Wood and wood products 36.0 21.2 57.2 62.9
Fuel and chemical products 
1 1,065.0 323.4 1,388.4 76.7
Rubber and plastic products 133.4 52.1 185.5 71.9
Basic metals and fabricated metal products  136.3 126.2 262.5 51.9
Electrical and optical equipments 670.8 69.0 739.8 90.7
Transport equipments 789.5 24.4 813.9 97.0
Electricity, gas and water supply 460.6 752.7 1,213.3 38.0
Construction 85.3 339.7 425.0 20.1
Wholesale, retail trade and repair 860.7 885.4 1,746.1 49.3
Hotels and restaurants 113.9 136.5 250.4 45.5
Transport, storage, post and telecommunications 1,092.0 798.1 1,890.1 57.8
Real estate, renting and business activities 937.9 1,720.8 2,658.7 35.3
Total 8,663.4 7,533.8 16,197.2 53.5
Note: 
1 Includes coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel and man-made fibers.
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2004).
Table 3. Concentration of Ownership Structure
of  the 100 Largest Hungarian Companies
Ranked by Sales in 1997
Owners' equity of enterprises
Industries, branches
 18(million HUF)
FIEs DEs FIEs/DEs FIEs DEs FIEs/DEs
Manufacturing 2.9 0.9 3.3 5.8 3.9 1.5
Food, beverages and tobacco products 2.8 1.3 2.2 6.6 3.9 1.7
Textiles 0.7 0.3 2.4 2.1 1.4 1.5
Wood and wood products 1.7 0.6 2.9 3.7 1.8 2
Fuel and chemical products 
1 5.9 1.7 3.5 14.4 11.4 1.3
Rubber and plastic products 1.8 1 1.9 4.6 3.5 1.3
Basic metals and fabricated metal products  1.9 1 1.9 4 2.9 1.4
Electrical and optical equipments 3.6 0.9 3.8 4.4 3.8 1.2
Transport equipments 5.6 0.8 6.7 10.3 7.4 1.4
Electricity, gas and water supply 4.6 2.5 1.8 11.3 7 1.6
Construction 2.6 1.5 1.8 5.4 3.2 1.7
Wholesale, retail trade and repair 6 2.5 2.4 6 3.3 1.8
Hotels and restaurants 0.8 0.5 1.6 3.4 1.9 1.8
Transport, storage, post and telecommunications 3.6 0.9 4.1 13.2 4.5 2.9
Real estate, renting and business activities 2.6 1.1 2.5 9 4.5 2
Total 3.4 1.3 2.6 6.5 3.8 1.7
Note: 
1 Includes coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel and man-made fibers.
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2004).














Sales per employee Gross value added per employeeChapter 1
Controlling blockholder dominated
Narrower public share ownership
Weaker shareholder rights
Weak role of stakeholders
Two-level board structure, mostly formal supervisory boards
Weaker litigation culture
Source: Illustrated by the author.
(% to GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Hungary 4.4 6.1 7.5 8.9 10.7 12.8
Poland 1.5 2.0 2.6 3.2 4.2 5.4
Germany 45.3 50.6 58.7 66.1 76.8 79.7
Source: Koke & Schroder (2003).
The Hungarian model of corporate governance
Table 6. The Hungarian Model of Corporate
Governance, 2004
Table 7. Financial Assets Under Institutional Management,
1995-2000
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Foreign Direct Investment and Corporate 




2.1  Introduction 
In May 2004, Hungary joined the European Union with seven other former socialist countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Baltic region,
1 materializing the countries long-
cherished dream of re-integrating with Europe. The fifteen-year reform efforts to tackle 
systemic transformation by the Hungarian government and its citizens finally paid off after 
their decision to break away from the socialist regime. 
The road to the EU accession has not been easy since the ‘European Agreements’, which 
proclaimed that the European club would allow membership from CEE countries, were signed 
in December 1991.
 2  However, Hungary, which had already been engaged in drastic reforms 
                                                      
1 The Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in Central and Eastern Europe, and Lithuania, 
Estonia and Latvia in the Baltic region.  The Mediterranean countries of Malta and Cyprus also 
acquired EU membership on this occasion. 
2 The ‘European Agreements’ set forth necessary matters regarding special economic relations 
between the EU and CEE countries, such as,  political dialogue, free mobilization, economic, 
cultural and financial cooperation between the two, as well as the candidate nations’ obligation 
to coordinate their domestic laws to meet designated EU standards (Tanaka, 1999, pp.8-9). Chapter 2 
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of its socio-economic systems before its application for membership in March 1994, had 
relatively smoothly met three criteria – politically, economically, and administratively – to be 
part of the EU, which was adopted at the Copenhagen summit in June 1993. As a result, 
Hungary was placed on the priority list of candidates for ‘Agenda 2000,’ which was drawn up 
in July 1997 to further clarify the policy of the EU enlargement, together with Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. Right after this, the Hungarian government started 
diplomatic negotiations with the EU committee with the aim of coordinating between ‘Acquis 
Communautaire’ – the code of EU laws and regulations – and Hungarian legislation, and 
settled all difficult issues in about thirty fields just before European leaders officially 
confirmed on December 13, 2002 that the EU would welcome new members including 
Hungary.
 3  In this regard, Hungary had always been a ‘front runner’ in the process of the EU 
enlargement towards the east. 
One of the main reasons why Hungary  has been able to promote its systemic 
transformation is that this small country attracted relatively large amounts of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The Hungarian government has been making great efforts to increase 
foreign investment from the very early stages of its transition to a market economy.  In fact, 
Hungary had been a leader in the region in terms of the total accumulated FDI inflows 
through to 1997. Although Poland and the Czech Republic have ranked higher than Hungary 
since 1998 in that category, the country received 24.4 billion USD as FDI during the twelve 
years from 1991 to 2002, accounting for 19.2% of the total in Central Europe and 14.9% of 
the total in CEE region.
4 This vast influx of foreign capital strengthened the Hungarian 
                                                      
3 The success of these negotiations is owed not only to the Hungarian government’s diplomatic 
efforts but also largely to political decisions of the EU.  Transitional measures included a 
moratorium on the adoption of EU standards had been agreed upon in a wide variety of 
negotiated areas.  For details on ‘Agenda 2000’ and ‘Acquis Communataire’ as well as on the 
process of negotiations between the EU and CEE countries, see Tanaka (1999, pp. 8-12), 
Momozumi (2000, pp. 521-535) and Tanaka (2002, pp. 161-168). 
4 Calculated based on UNCTAD (2003, p. 252).  Chapter 2 
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economy by spurring effective demand, contributing significantly to the restructuring of 
domestic firms through the conversion of corporate ownership structure, improvements in 
production system, strengthening market competitiveness, modernization of management 
systems, revitalization of R&D and innovation activities. In other words, FDI has been a 
powerful ‘driving force’ for Hungary to create an effective market economy, which was one 
of prerequisites for joining the EU. As Kárpáti (2003) states, the success of the Hungarian 
economy during this period was largely dependent upon foreign investment. 
This paper examines corporate restructuring in Hungary during the transition period 
with a special attention to FDI. The next section presents an overview of the roles of FDI in 
the growth and stability of Hungary’s macro-economy. Section 2.3 describes the effects of 
foreign investment and business activities of multinational corporations on reforms of 
corporate ownership and governance and on the improvement of efficiency in the 
management and production systems in the Hungarian firms. Section 2.4 examines the 
contributions of foreign companies to R&D and innovation activity. Concluding remarks 
follow. 
 
2.2 Roles of Foreign Direct Investment in the Stabilization and Growth 
of the Macro-Economy  
 
Hungary has enjoyed positive economic growth for ten straight years through 2003 after 
coming out of a debilitating economic slump which had continued until 1994 due to the 
confusion arising from the abandonment of its planned economy (Table 1 (a)).  According to 
preliminary data issued by Hungary’s Central Statistical Office (KSH), the real GDP growth 
rate for 2003 reached 2.9%, with the last ten year average standing at 3.5%. Since leading 
Hungarian think tanks foresee that the country will have from 3.3 to 3.7% growth for 2004 
(Konjunktúraelemzések,  2004, 4. o.), it is almost certain that Hungary will continue its 
economic growth also after the EU accession. This long-lasting economic boom has steadily 
pushed up Hungary’s national income, leading to an increase in its per capita GDP on a 
purchasing power parity basis to 53% of the average of 15 EU economies in 2002 (Havlik, 
2002, p. 4).  Chapter 2 
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Investment activities have been a key factor in Hungary’s long-term and stable 
economic growth. In contrast to its flagging household expenditures, gross domestic 
investment has continued to expand at a rapid pace after reaching its lowest point in 1992, 
and as shown in Figure 1, has grown 36.9% larger than in 1989, the last year of the socialist 
period.  Hungary’s booming economy of recent years has been driven by these intensive 
investment activities with their multiplying effects. In particular, foreign enterprises have 
contributed significantly in the form of FDI with positive crowd-in effects that have led to 
additional investment by domestic corporations (Mišun and Tomšík, 2002).
5 
The concentration of FDI in Hungary during the early 1990s is considered the result of 
political efforts to broadly open up its domestic market to foreign investors and intensely 
involved them in the privatization of state-owned enterprises.  According to some analysts, 
such policies may have been taken not because the Hungarian government was prescient 
about the future of its national economy, but largely because of Hungary’s political and 
economic situation at the time, such as the large amounts of foreign debt, serious current-
account and budget deficits, mounting pressure from international organizations that feared 
the government would default on the official aid loans, and active lobbying activities by 
multinational corporations and by their supporting governments in order for the corporations 
to take part in the privatization program. Regardless of the above factors, however, it is a fact 
that the Hungarian government succeeded in attracting large amounts of foreign capital 
especially in the privatization of the state-owned enterprises by continuously offering 
investment incentives such as large scale corporate tax holidays and the establishment of 
custom-free zones in line with the basic principle of opening up the market and letting foreign 
                                                      
5  Mišun and Tomšík (2002) verified FDI’s spill-over effects on domestic investment in Hungary, 
the Czech Republic and Poland by using panel data and investment models based on the mix of 
the stock adjustment theory and the adaptive expectation theory regarding investment for 
economic growth, which revealed that Hungary from 1990 to 2000 and the Czech Republic from 
1993 to 2000 both enjoyed FDI’s crowd-in-effects while Poland from 1990 to 2000 had crowd-
out-effects. Chapter 2 
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investors participate in privatizing state-owned businesses.
6 In fact, 66% of the total amount 
of FDI for Hungary between 1990 and 1999 was invested in privatizing state-owned 
enterprises (Antalóczy-Sass, 2002, 8. o.). The Hungarian government’s generousity in selling 
off its largest public corporations to foreign strategic investors led to the expansion of 
greenfield investment as well as to its export-driven economic growth as noted by Mihályi 
(2001, pp. 120-128). 
7 
As Oblath and Richter (2002) and Antalóczy-Sass (2002) strress, foreign companies 
now are increasing their additional investment in Hungary by using earnings gained from 
their business in the country (i.e. reinvestment earnings).
8 As a result, the gap between the 
amount of capital inflow from outside and that of investment by foreign companies including 
those in Hungary has been widening at a rapid pace.
9 The amount of this kind of reinvested 
earnings from 1996 to 2000 accounted for as much as 44.9% of the total amount of FDI 
during the same period (Antalóczy-Sass, 2002, 46. o.). This means that investment by foreign 
companies in Hungary is now far from diminishing and is still active enough to stimulate the 
economic growth by shoring up effective demand on the same large scale as that of the mid-
1990s, although capital sources of investment continue to sofisticate its main form with 
expansion of business activities by foreign companies. 
 
                                                      
6  Regarding the policy measures taken by the Hungarian government to enhance investment 
incentives, see Antalóczy-Sass (2003a) and Iwasaki and Sato (2004). 
7  The ratio of FDI to the total amount of privatization earnings obtained by the Hungarian 
government had rapidly declined as follows: 1996: 32.3%, 1997: 15.1%, 1998: 0.8%, 1990: 0%. 
(Antalóczy-Sass, 2002, 50. o.) 
8 ‘Reinvestment earnings’ are: (i) earnings of Hungarian affiliates/subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations that are not allocated to investors as dividends; and (ii) earnings of Hungarian 
branch offices of foreign corporations and those of foreign non-corporate entities that are not 
directly remitted to investors. 
9  Until 2003, the official FDI statistics on a balance-of-payments basis did not include the data on 
reinvestment earnings.  Figures in Table 1 (b) are those revised in 2004. Chapter 2 
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2.3 Foreign Direct Investment and Corporate Restructuring 
Large-scale and continous foreign capital inflows have completely changed the supply side of 
the Hungarian economy, that is, the corporate sector. The number of Hungarian companies 
with foreign participation increased 4.5 times from 1990 to 2002, and the amount of 
investment by foreign capital reached 720.7 billion HUF, or 80.7% of the total amount of 
equity capital of all Hungarian companies during the same period (Table 1 (b)). The role of 
these foreign enterprises has rapidly expanded in the employment, production, investment, 
and trade activites (Table 2).  In addition, as shown in Table 3 indicating the sectoral 
brakedown of FDI in 2002, foreign capital has made inroads into every area of the Hungarian 
economy, especially in manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and real estate and renting 
businesses. The same can be said about the financial sector.  By the end of 2000, foreign 
capital increased to 66.6% of the total subscribed capital in the banking sector and the number 
of banks with a foreign participation rate of more than 50% surged to 68.1% of all Hungarian 
commercial banks. (Várhegyi, 2001, 583-584. o.). According to Hamar (2004, 42. o.), the 
share of FDI of the total subscribed capital in the financial service sector also expanded from 
44% in 1996 to 89% in 2001.  
In Hungary, ‘foreign companies’ (külföldi érdekeltségű vállalkozás) are defined as those 
with a foreign participation rate of more than 10%. Almost all foreign companies in the 
country, however, far exceed such standard, as seen in the fact that the share of 100% foreign-
owned enterprises in the total number of Hungarian foreign companies increased from 1.8% 
in 1989 to 61.8% in 2000 while the share of joint venture companies with a domestic 
participation rate of over 50% sharply fell from 86.7% to 17.2% during the same period 
(Inzelt, 2003, p. 13). By the end of the 1990s, 76 of the top 100 of the world’s largest 
corporations had entered the Hungarian market in some form (Antalóczy-Sass, 2003b, 20. o.).  
Currently, establishing a 100%-owned subsidiary is the most common way of doing business 
in Hungary for major multinational companies. This trend can be seen also for Japanese 
companies operating in Hungary. As of March 2003, 61 or 70.1% of 87 Japanese-capital-
affiliated enterprises in Hungary were wholly owned subsidiaries of Japanese parent 
companies or those of Japanese companies’ affiliates in Europe (Table 4). This trend has been Chapter 2 
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gaining momentum against the background of an increasing number of Japanese companies 
coming to the country as suppliers for European affiliates of Japanese electronic and auto 
manufacturers. Hungarian affiliates of these Japanese corporations such as Panasonic, SONY 
and SUZUKI, as well as those of other multinational enterprises such as Audi, Philips, IBM, 
Nokia, GE and Opel, have now become the leading companies in Hungary. This is why 
Hungary is known as a country, along with Ireland and Malaysia, whose industry is 
overwhelmingly dominated by foreign capital (Hunya, 2002, p. 11). 
As already mentioned in the previous section, the priority of selling off state-owned 
enterprises to strategic investors, as well as greenfield investment activities by multinational 
corporations, has led to the emergence of strong corporate ownership of Hungary’s core 
businesses. Direct corporate control by these new types of owners has been effective in 
alleviating so-called ‘agency problems’ and has prevented Hungary from being troubled by 
serious corporate governance woes – especially, those arising from heavy insider-control 
ownership – which have confronted other post-communist countries. In this context, it is 
remarkable that Török (1998, p. 172) presented the view that in Hungarian companies, 
management and supervisory organs including the Board of Directors, do not have a 
substantial influence on corporate strategies except for daily management issues. 
Foreign companies thus formed a ‘mega economic sector’ in Hungary (Nishimura, 2000, 
p. 336) and brought about significant changes in the corporate ownership and governance 
structure of Hungarian firms. The increased number of foreign-owned companies has had a 
remarkable influence on Hungary’s industrial and trading structures, especially in its 
manufacturing sector, and greatly contributed to the improvement of its productivity. 
The penetration of foreign capital has resulted in drastic changes to Hungary’s industrial 
structure.  From 1995 to 2002, the share of the manufacturing sector in the total industrial 
production increased by 8.0% to 90.4% (Table 5). During the same period, production in the 
machine industries, in which about half of Hungary’s total FDI has been concentrated, 
jumped phenomenally to 29.0% of the total industrial production, while the share of 
traditional industrial sectors in the socialist era including food, wood and papar, and light 
industries combined declined by as much as 10.6%. The market environment also greatly 
changed during this time.  For example, according to estimates by Éltető (2001, pp. 6-10), the Chapter 2 
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market share of 100% domestically-owned enterprises was completely surpassed by that of 
foreign-affiliated companies during the seven years from 1993 to 1999. The share of foreign 
enterprises in the manufacturing sector and in the export market increased to 71.8% and to 
88.6% respectively in 1999.  Based on a review of financial data of Hungarian manufacturing 
companies from 1996 to 2000, Hamar points out  that there was a significant positve relation 
between these companies’ foreign participation rates and their degrees of export orientation, 
which is consistent with the findings of Éltető (2001).
10 
Under these circumstamces, the total trade volume of Hungary surged 10.8 times from 
1992 to 2002, while that with EU members rose at a more rapid pace, marking a 15.3 times 
increase over the same period.
11 Such dominance of foreign enterprises over the export 
activities is closely related to the fact that the affiliates of multinational corporations in 
Hungary have continued to actively supply their products to EU markets in line with their 
global marketing strategies. 
Many previoius studies indicate that foreign firms greatly contributed to the 
improvement of productivity of the Hungarian corporate sector.  For example, Hunya (2002, 
p. 12) estimates that labor productivity of foreign companies was as much as 3.1 times higher 
than that of domestic firms in 1999, the largest difference noticed among ten Central and 
Eastern European countries.
12 The statistical office also recognized that a significant labor 
productivity gap does exist between the two groups (KSH, 2003d). They estimate that the 
average added-value per employee of foreign firms was 1.8 times higher than domestic 
corporations, adding that much larger gaps were observed in several industrial categories 
(Table 6). Moreover, Hamar (2004, 43-44. o.) estimates that the difference between foreign 
corporations and domestic firms in productivity, added-value, wage level and capital 
equipment ratio per employee reached 2.9 times, 4.0 times, 1.6 times and 3.2 times 
respectively in 2000. 
                                                      
10 The ‘degree of export orientation’ is defined as the share of exports in total net sales. 
11 Calculated based on Magyar Statistikai Évkönyv 2002 (2003, 331. o.). 
12  Judging the context, the estimation was conducted only for manufacturing firms. Chapter 2 
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There also have been many quantitative analyses on this topic. By estimating Cobb-
Douglas production functions based on cross-section data of 1994-1997, Szekeres (2001) 
show that total factor productivity (TFP) tended to improve in proportion to the growth of the 
foreign participation rate.  Using a large-scale database covering about 90% of all Hungarian 
manufacturing and construction firms, Sgard (2001) confirmed that TFP showed a significant 
increase of 38.5% on average when the foreign ownership rate was expanded from 0% to 
100%.  Novák (2002) also found that Hungarian corporations with a foreign ownership rate of 
over 50% probably succeeded in the improvement of their productivity at a faster pace than 
other enterprises, based on regression analysis on the productivity of foreign-owned 
corporations by estimating three quantitative models including a simultaneous equation model 
designed to treat the endogeneity of the investment decision-making process of foreign firms. 
The above research suggest that there is a close relation between the fact-finding of 
Oblath and Richter (2002, p. 17) in which the productivity of the Hungarian  manufacturing 
sector rose at an average annual rate of 15.4% from 1993 to 2000 – a much faster pace than 
any other CEE countries – and large inflows of foreign capital into Hungary during this 
period. However, categorizing Hungarian firms into only two groups, ‘foreign-affiliated 
corporations’ and ‘domestically-owned corporations’ is insufficient.  As Halpern and Kőrösi 
(2000) and Novák (2003) point out, it is impossible to strictly verify the relation between the 
growth of foreign investment and the improvement of productivity, considering the selection 
bias that foreign investors may choose domestic companies for investment, because those 
companies have the significant potential to improve their own management efficiency and 
productivity in comparison with their competitors.
 13 Furthermore, we have to pay attention to 
the possibility that the improvement of profitability and productivity of foreign corporations 
                                                      
13 While Halpern and Kőrösi (2000) state, based on their estimates of Dynamic Cobb-Douglas 
frontier production functions using dataset from 1990 to 1997, that selection bias effects can be 
observed only during the initial few years of the transition period, Novák (2003), who came up 
with estimated production functions in fixed effect models by using 1992 – 1998 panel data on 
industrial firms, suggests that selection bias effects are universal.  In this way, there are different 
views on selection bias effects over time.   Chapter 2 
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in their accounts might be largely due to preferential investment incentives toward foreign 
investors adopted by the Hungarian government, which was not granted to domestic 
enterprises. A way to mitigate these problems is to compare newly established FDI-based 
companies and major domestic corporations. Here, we discuss Hungarian affiliates of 
multinational corporations.  As already mentioned above, those local subsidiaries – almost all 
of which were established in the framework of greenfield investment – can fully utilize 
management know-how and production technologies devised by their parent multinational 
firms. Therefore, such wholly owned companies of multinationals could easily dominate 
privatized, formerly state-owned enterprises and other domestic corporations – both of which 
have been afflicted with a negative legacy from the socialist era – in terms of management 
efficiency and productivity. Results of empirical analysis support this presumption. 
Table 7, which compares Hungary’s major 167 corporations listed in Figyelő magazine 
in 2002 by using representative management and financial indexes, reveals that there is a 
clear difference in average performance between multinational-affiliated corporations and 
domestic corporations.
14 In particular, there is a large gap in statistical significance between 
the two groups regarding return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). This is   
noteworthy, as it demonstrates that affiliate companies of multinationals enjoy remarkable 
capital efficiency.  
Next we examined the effects of the organizational form as a multinational affiliate 
company on TFP by regression analysis. Following Szekeres (2001), we estimated log-linear 
Cob-Douglas function with a constant dummy (MNCs), which controls the recognition of 
being a 100% multinational-affiliate, and checked its value and statistical significance. Two 
kinds of data – the first set is an unbalanced panel of 237 corporations and the second set is a 
balanced panel of 118 corporations, both of which are listed on Figyelő magazine’s leading 
corporation rankings through to 1999 – were used for estimation. We conducted cross-section 
                                                      
14 Most of the domestic corporations used in the analysis are public enterprises and privatized ex 
state-owned firms.  The latter include many foreign companies.  Therefore, the problem of 
superficial accounting improvements owing to favorable policies for FDI can be mostly 
eliminated in the analysis. Chapter 2 
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analyses for each of the 1999-2002 data and panel-data analyses using all observations. In the 
latter case, individual effects of samples were taken into consideration by estimating fixed 
and ramdom effects models. 
Panel (a) in Table 8 shows results based on the unbalanced panel data, and panel (b) 
refers to those based on the balanced panel. These results are almost satisfactory, because 
signs of explanatory variables are consistent with theoretical assumptions and the hypothesis 
of constant returns to scale is virtually met in all cases. 
The effects of MNCs on TFP are positive throughout the analytical period with 
statistical significance. In addition, the fixed effect model and random effects model 
estimations indicate that there is a 1% level of significant difference between the above two 
sampling groups regarding the mean of individual effects. That is to say, multinational 
corporations had much larger individual effects than other corporations. These findings verify 
the superiority of multinational corporations as production organizations compared to other 
Hungarian enterprises. Therefore, our empirical results – which strongly suggest that the 
expansion of multinational corporations contributed to the improvement of efficiency in the 
overall corporate sector in Hungary – supports assertions by preceding studies by Hunya 
(2002) and others. 
In summary, the large-scale FDI inflow and massive embarkation of multinational 
corporations changed the corporate ownership and governance structure in Hungarian firms as 
well as played a crucial role in improving export competitiveness and streamlining its 
management and production activities. The next section will further demonstrates FDI effects 
by focusing on R&D and innovation activities, both of which are also important aspects of 
corporate restructuring. 
 
2.4 Foreign Direct Investment and R&D / Innovation Activities 
In the late 1980s, Hungary spent 2.5% of its GDP on R&D, which is a large percentage by 
international standards of the time (Balázs, 1994, p. 283). However, the ensuing full-fledged 
transition to a market economy brought about a drastic reduction in Hungary’s R&D activities.  
By 1996, the R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP dropped to 0.7% and the total number Chapter 2 
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of researchers fell by 53.2%. In particular, the number of corporate researchers diminished 
sharply by 76.6% during the same period (Table 9). Even during the high economic growth 
after 1997, R&D activities stagnated at low levels. In 2002, the R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP was almost 1.0%, which is much lower than those recorded during the 
socialist era.  This scale is much smaller than the average of developed countries, as well as 
that of 15 EU nations (Figure 2). Figure 3 indicates that although R&D activities in Hungary 
have been on the rise over the past few years, their growth rates have been very moderate. 
The R&D expenditure for 2002 was still below the 1990 level.   
The full-scale transition to a market economy, the disappearance of the COMECON 
market and the drastic reduction in the government’s R&D spending including those for 
corporate subsidies were grave ‘external shocks’ which led to the rapid downsizing of the 
national R&D sector. At the initial transition stage of economic transformation, the 
Hungarian government did not initiate consistent policies to stimulate R&D and innovation 
activities due to the lack of clear recognition regarding the linkage between economic growth 
and technological development – which also accelerated the stagnation of its R&D sector 
(Havas, 2002, pp. 16-17). 
Meanwhile, as many researchers point out, Hungary’s R&D system during its socialist 
era was far from effective, since it did not strongly motivate researchers to pursue their R&D 
and innovation activities.
15 In addition, the size of R&D sectors in CEE countries including 
                                                      
15  For more details, see Balázs (1994, pp. 283-284), Tanaka (1993, pp. 212-215), Matsui (1996, pp. 
69-70), and Inzelt (1998, p. 63).  These researchers point out the following as causes of the 
previous ineffective R&D sector in Hungary:  (a) Localized division of roles by academic 
research institutions, high educational insitutions and industrial research institutions.  (b) 
Domestic enterprises’ low consciousness of the benefits of R&D activities.  (c) Non-availability 
of economic institutions and agents able to build a bridge between the R&D sector and the 
industrial sector. Chapter 2 
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Hungary was too large in relation to their economic scales.
16 Therefore, it is no surprise that 
those countries had to reorganize and downsize their R&D units to suit their national wealth 
along with changes in their socio-economic systems. Inzelt (1998; 2003), Szalavetz (1999), 
and Nikodémis (2003) emphasize the importance of the ‘spontanenous adjustment processs’ 
relative to ‘external shocks’ in the modanization of the industrial technology, recognizing that 
a substantial reduction of R&D expenditure and research staff at the corporate level had 
produced restructuring effects necessary for the Hungarian firms to adapt to a market 
economy. As already clarified in the previous section, FDI and foreign-affiliated companies 
played a crucial role in the revitalization of the Hungarian economy. Therefore, the preceding 
studies paid considerable attention to the relation between ownership forms of enterprises and 
their R&D/innovation activities. 
According to these studies, foreign-affiliated corporations may have been more engaged 
in R&D activities than the wholly domestic enterprises from the early stage of transition. For 
instance, Inzelt (1998, p. 68) refers to the strong link between foreign ownership rates and 
R&D expenditure based on the enterprise survey conducted by the statistical office in 1996.  
Furthermore, she suggests that foreign investors have been constantly utilizing many of R&D 
units of Hungarian companies they bought with the aim of introducing new production 
licenses and know-how (op. cit., pp. 69-70). Moreover, Nikodémis (2003, 41-42. o.) points 
out that multinational corporations in Hungary boosted their R&D spending by five times in  
real terms over the six-year period from 1995 to 2000. As a result, the share of multinational 
companies in the total R&D spending in the corporate sector increased from 22% to almost 
80% during the period. As indicated in Figure 4, the proportion of R&D spending by 
multinationals in the Hungarian corporate sector is extremely high by international standards.  
Nikodémis states that this is further highlighted by the fact that domestically-owned 
corporations, especially small and medium size enterprises, were substantially cutting or 
restraining R&D expenditures in that period. 
                                                      
16 According to Knell (2000, pp. 201-202), as of 1990, scales of R&D activities in CEE countries 
and in Russia were comparable to those of Western developed nations, such as Germany and 
France. Chapter 2 
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The same trend can be seen for innovation activities. The latest survey by the statistical 
office (KSH, 2003b) covering 26,495 manufacturing companies reveals that there is a certain 
gap between domestic and foreign companies in terms of achievements in innovation 
activities. Table 10 shows that 3,441 or 15.1% of 22,186 wholly domestically-owned 
corporations surveyed conducted innovation activities during 1999 to 2001, while 1,055 or 
28.7% of 3,679 foreign-affiliated enterprises carried  out such activities during the same 
period, which is about 1.9 times larger than that of the former on a percentage basis.   
Meanwhile, the statistical office obtained similar results to the above based on another 
enterprise survey for 1997 to 1999 (KSH, 2001).  Hence foreign-affiliated enterprises may 
have been continuously more active in innovation activities than domestic corporations. 
Szalavetz (1999, 37.o.), who conducted an in-depth interview survey of fifteen 
manufacturing companies under the control of German capital, advocates that “the 
technological benefits of being owned by multinational corporations can be summarized by 
the fact that domestic firms were able to accelerate their technology accumulation process 
with the help of foreign direct investment”, adding that the “Hungarian economy has been 
modernized at a remarkable scale as a result of technology transfer through foreign 
investment”. 
In addition to this paper, there are many other studies focusing on the achievements of 
technology transfer and spillover effects stemming from R&D and innovation activities by 
foreign corporations. For example, Antalóczy-Sass (2000; 2003b) found the effects of 
technology transfer in qualitative changes in Hungary’s export structure from the late 1990s.  
As indicated in Table 11, Hungary’s top 10 export goods for 2002, five of which were high-
tech products, are products of foreign-affiliated enterprises that carried out greenfield 
investments within custom-free zones. The total export volume of high-tech products 
increased by as much as 5.3 times on a US dollar basis from 1992 to 2002 (Table 12). The 
total imports of high-tech products also expanded by 7.6 times during the same period partly 
due to foreign corporations’ rising demand for plant and equipment investment.  Based on 
statistical data, Hamar (2004) examined the role of foreign capital from the viewpoint of 
Hungary’s technological catching-up and confirmed that industrial sectors requiring higher Chapter 2 
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technologies have larger foreign participation rates (Table 13).  These findings indicate the 
benefits of technology transfers brought about by FDI. 
Szanyi (2002) focused on technological spillover effects arising from outsourcing 
contracts and from supplier agreements between multinationals and domestic companies, 
which has been rapidly spreading among Hungarian industrial firms in recent years. He found 
that small and medium size firms are actively involved in businesses outsourced from 
multinational enterprises, and aim to adapt to a market economy as well as undergo 
restructuring. That is, these domestic enterprises regard outsourcing contracts with 
multinationals as “the most important sources of technologies, competitive products and 
markets, each of which is necessary for their modernization” (p. 20). Meanwhile, 
multinationals are also actively promoting their subcontractors to introduce new management 
techniques and carry out other organizational innovations (Havas, 2002, p. 28). In addition, 
these domestic corporations are devoting themselves to renewing their production facilities, 
developing new products, preparing to meet domestic needs, streamlining production systems, 
and improving designs on the basis of outsourcing contracts. 
There have also been several empirical works on spillover effects brought about by 
foreign capital. For example, Novák (2003) confirms the existence of FDI spillover effects by 
detecting a significant positive correlation between TFP and the share of multinational 
corporations in the total sales in each industrial sector.
17 Sgard (2002) shows the high 
significance of these spillover effects by introducing into production functions the share of 
foreign capital in the total equity capital by sector.
18 
                                                      
17 The coefficients of spillover effects had a positive sign with statistical significance regarding 
enterprises with 100 or more employees throughout the analytical period, while with enterprises 
with fewer than 100 employees, it had a negative sige with statistical significance for the first 
half of the 1990s and had no significance for the second half of 1990s.  
18 Sgard (2002, pp. 9-11) also reports that the northwest region between the border of the EU and 
Budapest is enjoying more positive spillover effects than southern and eastern regions, which 
might have widened the regional gap in the productivity of local enterprises. Chapter 2 
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The above two studies highlight the major role played by foreign capital and 
multinational corporations in the restructuring process of industrial technologies in the 
corporate sector. As mentioned in the previous section, drastic structural changes in the 
Hungarian manufacturing sector as well as the significant improvement of its export 
competitiveness were leveraged by the introduction of foreign capital. In addition, it is clear 
that foreign-affiliated corporations supported the overall industrial sector in terms of R&D 
and innovation activities. It is also a noticeable trend that in recent years, foreign companies 
in Hungary have been actively hiring Hungarian researchers and strengthening ties with 
domestic universities and research institutes, as pointed out by Havas (2002, p. 29) 
However, the above series of positive moves does not imply that an internationally 
competitive R&D sector is now emerging in Hungary.  Firstly, the quantitative analyses 
performed by Török and Petz (1999) and Knell (2000) show that R&D activities are not a 
strong explanatory factor for Hungary’s enhanced export competitiveness and its improved 
productivity in the late 1990s.
19 Secondly, the number of patent applications per 100 
corporate researchers, a common indicator of productivity of R&D and innovation activities, 
dropped by 40% from 19.5% in 1994 to 11.7% in 2002.
 20 Thirdly, the already mentioned 
enterprise survey (KSH, 2003) indicates that 83% of manufacturing companies polled did not 
carry out any innovation activities from 1999 to 2001, almost the same percentages as that 
                                                      
19 Török and Petz (1999, 225-227. o.) regressed the export-orientation ratio (ratio of exports to 
imports) to the R&D input ratio (ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP), skilled-labor ratio and 
foreign capital investment ratio, while Knell (2000, pp. 208-209) conducted regression analysis 
using the labor productivity improvement rate as a dependent variable and the R&D imput ratio 
and the manufacturing productivity growth rate as regressors.  As a result, the former research 
confirmed that the coefficient of the R&D input ratio does not have economically-significant 
explanatory power, and the latter led to the conclusion that the R&D input ratio has no statistical 
significance. 
20 Calculated based on Table 9. Chapter 2 
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recorded in the previous investigations by the statistical office.
21 These findings strongly 
suggest that Hungary still has a long way to go before achieving rationalization and 
revitalization of R&D and innovation activities. FDI and multinational corporations are 
expected to make a further contribution to this field.  
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This paper presents analysis of the roles of FDI in the corporate restructuring in Hungary 
from a multilateral standpoint during the process of the EU accession of Hungary after the 
abolition of the socialist planned economy. Foreign capital and multinational enterprises 
made a significant contribution to this development. However, there are several problems in 
relying on FDI to carry out economic transformation and to promote corporate restructuring.  
Firstly, there has been an increasing amount of profit repatriation by multinationals in recent 
years, which might further increase the current account deficit. For example, the direct 
investment income balance recorded a deficit of 3.34 billion Euro in 2003, which is almost 
the same amount as the total FDI gross inflow in that year (Table 1 (b)).  Secondly, financial 
strains on domestic corporations and on the public arising from the preferential measures for 
foreign-owned enterprises have been distorting resource allocations and generating economic 
inequity between those who can enjoy the benefits of FDI and those who cannot. Thirdly, 
regional disparity in income and unemployment has been widening due to the concentration 
of FDI in particular regions. Fourthly, behind the rapid growth of the foreign corporate sector, 
technology networks and inter-industrial relations forged during the socialist era have been 
completely abandoned, leading to the emergence of ‘technological economic dualism’ (Farkas, 
2000, p. 19). Resolving this problem remains a difficult policy challenge for the Hungarian 
government. And fifthly, the national economies dependence on foreign capital has been 
creating anxiety among Hungarian citizens about the future of the country, putting them in 
                                                      
21 For more details, see Inzelt (1994, pp. 149-150), KSH (2001, 7. o.), and Nagaoka and Iwasaki 
(2003, pp. 12-14). Chapter 2 
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fear of losing their national identity as well as of a massive withdrawal of multinational 
corporations from Hungary, which may lead to the hollowing out of domestic industries.
22 
However, it is apparent that active investment activities by foreign corporations lowered 
hurdles for Hungary to transform its economic system to a market economy by overcoming 
capital shortage, boosted the domestic corporate sector, and greatly improved the position of 
Hungary in the world economy through the substantial expansion of exports (Szekeres, 2001, 
p. 380). Such a tremendous contribution by FDI and multinational enterprises to the 
Hungarian economy and industries more than offsets the problematic side effects listed above.  
Nevertheless, large-scale foreign capital inflow cannot corporate restructuring related 
problems in the country, as suggested by the analyses in the previous section referring to 
R&D and innovation activities. The remaining problems that have not been examined in this 
paper include the underdevelopment of small and medium size enterprises, the unbalanced 
corporate financial structure heavily dependent on retained earnings, and the insufficiency of 
supervision activities over managers by shareholders and by financial institutions. The 
following remarks were made by Szalavets (2002) regarding policies to be taken up by the 
CEE countries after EU accession:  
“The transforming countries, in the ‘long transition decade’, have remarkable had 
success with minimal state intervention.  By adapting a passive policy approach, they have 
allowed themselves to be driven forward by the modernizing effects of foreign direct 
investment. However, the challenges that follow EU accession will compel them to adopt an 
approach of more active state involvement.  Local economic policy decision-makers will need 
to work out how to redefine the position of their countries in the world economy.”(p. 5)  
Inspired by recommendations such as the above, there is a growing opinion in Hungary 
calling for the modification of the current policies focusing on attracting foreign capital, in 
order to achieve sustainable economic growth over the medium and long term. The passive 
strategy for transition to a market economy, which has been driven by the Hungarian 
government and the business sector, is standing at a crucial turning point. 
                                                      
22 For details on points raised here, see Farkas (2000), Nishimura (2001), and Nagaoka and Iwasaki 
(2003). Chapter 2 
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Employment 24 33 29 32 36 37 35 35
Net sales revenue 38 41 44 48 48 50 47 49
Added value 39 39 43 48 48 49 44 45
Investment 51 60 54 60 60 59 53 50
Exports 54 58 69 75 77 80 73 81
Imports 57 63 70 74 74 76 71 79
Source : Based on KSH (2003a, 16, 21. o.) and Fazekas (2003, 220. o).
Notes: 
1 Figures indicate share of foreign-affiliated enterprises with 10 percent or more of foreign ownership in the overall corporate
sector.
              
3 Calculation on a equity capital basis.
Table 2.  Position of Foreign Companies in the Corporate Sector 
1
              
2 Calculation on a subscribed capital basis.
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 43Table 1.  Selected Indices of the Macro Economy and Foreign Direct Investment,
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
(a) Macroeconomic indices
Gross domestic product
1 ▲ 3.5 ▲ 11.9 ▲ 3.1 ▲ 0.6 2.9
Gross industrial production
1 ▲ 3.3 ▲ 18.3 ▲ 9.7 4.0 9.6
Gross domestic investment
1 ▲ 9.8 ▲ 12.3 ▲ 1.5 2.5 12.3
Consumer price index
1 28.9 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8
Unemployment rate (ILO method) - - 9.8 11.9 10.7
Trade balance (million USD) 9.4 ▲ 12.0 ▲ 3.7 ▲ 36.2 ▲ 38.5
Total exports (million USD) 95.9 101.9 107.1 89.1 107.0
Total imports (million USD) 86.5 113.8 110.8 125.3 145.5
Current account balance (million EUR) 1.1 2.2 2.4 ▲ 29.6 ▲ 33.0
(b) FDI indices
2
Annual FDI inflow (million EUR) 
3 244 1,186 1,142 2,039 966
Accumulated FDI stock (million EUR) 
3 244 1,430 2,572 4,610 5,576
Annual FDI inflow per capita (EUR) 
4 24 114 110 197 93
Accumulated FDI stock per capita (EUR) 
4 24 138 248 445 539
Direct investment income (million EUR) ▲ 19 ▲ 26 ▲ 34 ▲ 48 ▲ 98
Number of foreign capital-affiliated enterprises
5 5,693 9,117 17,182 20,999 23,557
Total equity capital (billion HUF) 
5 274.2 475.6 713.1 1,113.2 1,398.2
Total foreign capital participation (billion HUF) 
5 93.2 215.0 401.8 662.9 833.5
Foreign capital participation rate (%) 
5 34.0 45.2 56.3 59.5 59.6
44
                    4 Calculated by the author based on total number of population of each year.
                    5 Figures from 1990 to 1994 are on a subscribed capital basis.
Source: Compiled by the author based on KSH, Magyar Statistikai Évkönyv  (various years), KSH (2003a, 11 o.), official      
Statistical Office website (http://www.ksh.hu/).
Notes: 
1 Figures are year-on-year percentage changes.
                     2 Annual FDI inflow, accumulated FDI stock, per capita FDI inflow, per capita accumulated FDI stock (EUR)  and   
                     3 Figures from 1990 to 1994 exclude reinvestment earnings.
Chapter 21990-2003
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.7 3.5 2.9
4.6 3.4 11.1 12.5 10.4 18.7 3.6 2.8 6.4
▲ 5.3 5.2 8.5 12.7 5.3 7.4 3.2 7.8 3.1
28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8 9.2 5.3 4.7
10.2 9.9 8.7 7.8 7.0 6.4 5.7 5.8 5.9
▲ 26.0 ▲ 24.4 ▲ 21.3 ▲ 27.0 ▲ 30.0 ▲ 39.9 ▲ 31.8 ▲ 32.8 ▲ 46.7
128.7 157.0 191.0 230.1 250.1 280.9 305.0 343.4 430.1
154.7 181.4 212.3 257.1 280.1 320.8 336.8 376.1 476.8
▲ 12.7 ▲ 14.1 ▲ 18.1 ▲ 30.3 ▲ 35.3 ▲ 43.8 ▲ 36.1 ▲ 49.0 ▲ 64.9
3,399 2,143 3,165 2,381 2,489 2,645 2,575 3,068 3,439
8,975 11,118 14,283 16,664 19,153 21,798 24,373 27,441 30,880
328 208 307 232 243 259 252 302 339
865 1,077 1,387 1,621 1,868 2,132 2,390 2,697 3,045
▲ 149 ▲ 190 ▲ 377 ▲ 792 ▲ 787 ▲ 824 ▲ 867 ▲ 1,050 ▲ 3,304
24,163 25,671 26,083 26,264 26,438 26,634 26,809 25,693 -
1,972.8 2,438.2 3,470.4 5,001.8 6,282.8 7,608.1 7,787.5 8,703.9 -
1,466.2 1,945.1 2,867.3 4,012.6 5,086.0 5,998.0 6,195.2 7,020.7 -
74.3 79.8 82.6 80.2 81.0 78.8 79.6 80.7 -
Chapter 2
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statistics available at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank website (http://www.mnb.hu/) and the Hungarian Central
FDI income are net figures based on a balance-of-payments basis.Chapter 2
Table 3.  Foreign Direct Investment by Industrial Sector, 2002
Number  Share (%) Billion HUF Share (%)
Agriculture 861 3.4 94.6 1.1 89.6
Mining and quarrying 59 0.2 18.1 0.2 85.6
Manufacturing 3,692 14.4 3,990.7 45.8 79.9
Food, beverages and tobacco products 435 1.7 528.1 6.1 88.9
Textiles 414 1.6 66.1 0.8 91.7
Leathers 107 0.4 18.8 0.2 96.3
Wood and wood products 165 0.6 34.5 0.4 92.8
Pulp, paper, paper products and printing 378 1.5 120.3 1.4 88.5
Fuel and chemical products 
1 137 0.5 1,064.3 12.2 42.3
Rubber and plastic products 273 1.1 133.1 1.5 92.9
Other non-metallic mineral products 157 0.6 184.0 2.1 94.3
Basic metals and fabricated metal products  519 2.0 128.7 1.5 92.3
Machinery and equipments 328 1.3 227.2 2.6 87.4
Electrical and optical equipments 457 1.8 675.6 7.8 96.9
Transport equipments 108 0.4 786.6 9.0 97.0
Others 214 0.8 23.4 0.3 90.2
Electricity, gas and water supply 52 0.2 460.6 5.3 70.6
Construction 1,004 3.9 84.5 1.0 87.2
Wholesale, retail trade and repair 10,618 41.3 846.6 9.7 94.7
Hotels and restaurants 1,221 4.8 111.8 1.3 68.2
Transport, storage, post and telecommunications 766 3.0 1,086.2 12.5 63.8
Financial intermediation 220 0.9 896.8 10.3 92.3
Real estate and renting and business activities 6,356 24.7 1,043.2 12.0 83.7
Others 844 3.3 70.8 0.8 84.3
Total 25,693 100.0 8,703.9 100.0 80.7
Table 4.  Types of Japanese Enterprises in Hungary by Industrial Sector, As of March 2003
(No. of enterprises)
Manufacturing Trade Finance  Others  Total
Subsidiaries/Affiliations 33 33 1 7 74
腀Wholly owned Japanese corporations 19 11 0 3 33
腀Joint venture enterprises 5503 1 3
腀Others
2 9 1 711 2 8
Liaison offices 5503 1 3
Total 38 38 1 10 87
Notes: 
1 Includes construction, consulting services and software development.
                2 Includes corporations in European countries.
Source: Compiled by the author based on JETRO Budapest Office (2003).
Notes: 
1 Includes coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel and man-made fibers.




Enterprises Total equity capital
Industry, branch
46(Total gross output=100)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining and quarrying 1.3 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5
Manufacturing 82.4 82.3 84.2 86.2 87.7 89.8 90.1 90.4
Light industries 
2 33.8 32.9 29.3 27.4 26.2 24.4 23.9 23.2
Food, beverages and tobacco products 24.1 23.7 20.2 18.4 17.5 15.8 15.1 14.9
Textiles 3.4 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.7
Leathers 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
Wood and wood products 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
Pulp, paper, paper products and printing 4.1 3.8 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 3.9
Raw material industries
 2 33.6 32.4 31.2 29.2 25.4 24.2 23.7 23.2
Fuel products 7.4 7.2 6.4 6.6 5.2 4.4 4.1 4.0
Chemical products 11.4 10.7 10.5 8.7 7.2 6.8 6.3 6.2
Rubber and plastic products 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.5
Other non-metallic mineral products 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.7
Basic metals and fabricated metal products  8.7 8.4 8.3 7.7 7.1 7.3 7.3 6.8
Machine industries 
2 13.7 16.1 22.4 28.4 35.0 40.1 41.4 42.7
Machinery and equipments 4.8 4.5 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.7 4.0 5.1
Electrical and optical equipments 4.0 5.6 9.2 12.2 17.5 23.0 24.0 24.5
Transport equipments 4.9 6.0 9.1 12.2 13.5 13.4 13.4 13.1
Others 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4
Electricity, gas and water supply 16.3 16.4 14.8 13.1 11.6 9.7 9.3 9.1
Notes: 
1 All figures are based on 2002 prices.
               腀 2 A category introduced by the author for special reference.
Source: Based on KSH (2003c, 266. o.).













100% 50-99膓 Less than 50 %
Overall corporate sector 56.7 90.0 119.9 92.1
Food, Beverage 42.5 126.3 98.8 70.9
Chemical 35.1 106.8 99.6 94.4
Electronics 63.1 99.0 96.8 124.3
Transport equipment 20.5 112.5 86.4 23.5
Power generation 84.3 101.1 99.9 101.2
Agriculture 47.8 115.1 81.5 75.8
Construction 49.8 900.6 50.0 86.9
Wholesale 44.2 104.2 90.3 91.6
Retail 83.3 111.6 60.5 101.8
Land transport  52.9 97.5 161.9 67.9
Post/Telecommunications 11.6 33.9 87.4 243.6
Real estate 18.9 142.6 37.4 144.2
Services 51.9 97.6 111.3 87.8















All 167 enterprises 315.89 3,813.63 4,073.02 84.36 7.53
Subsidiaries of
multinational enterprises 347.48 4,734.69 4,348.71
* 179.45
** 9.73
Other enterprises 297.23 3,269.76 3,910.24 28.21 6.23
Source: Author's estimation based on Figyelő (2003, 32-39. o.).
            
3 **: Statistical significance of difference in mean values from domestic enterprises at the 5% level, *: at the 10% level.
Table 7.  Performance of 167 Largest Hungarian Enterprises, FY2002
Notes: 
1 Return on equity = current profits / equity capital
            
2 Return on assets = current profits / total assets




Notes: The above figures are those when the average added-value per employee of foreign-affiliated






Table 8.  Regression Analysis on Efficiency of Local Subsidiaries of Multinational Enterprises




































(2.80 ) (2.50 ) (2.83 ) (3.11 ) (5.57 )




(1.93 ) (8.93 ) (9.18 )




(3.30 ) (15.43 ) (16.02 )




(3.50 ) (15.87 ) (16.63 )
Mean of individual effects
Multinationals - - - - - 0.230
† 0.205
†
Other firms - - - - - -0.134 -0.096
R
2 0.329 0.297 0.279 0.340 0.324 0.970 0.794
Adj. R









N 144 161 189 184 678 678 678
(Continued on the next page)
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1999 2000 2001 2002
Fixed effects
 2 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
1999-2002
Random effectsChapter 2



































(2.76 ) (2.45 ) (2.86 ) (3.28 ) (5.67 )




(2.34 ) (9.06 ) (9.31 )




(3.28 ) (14.06 ) (14.68 )




(3.80 ) (15.59 ) (16.22 )
Mean of individual effects
Multinationals - - - - - 0.451
† 0.376
†
Other firms - - - - - -0.190 -0.159
R
2 0.380 0.303 0.314 0.329 0.352 0.973 0.559
Adj. R









N 118 118 118 118 472 472 472
2 Hausman test for the specification of the fixed and random effects models: χ
2=18.625, p=0.002.
3 Hausman test for the specification of the fixed and random effects models: χ
2=15.871, p=0.003.
5 †: Statistical significance of the mean differences from domestic enterprises at the 1% level.
Source: Estimated by the author based on Figyelo (2001, 30-37. o.; 2002, 30-37. o.; 2003, 32-39. o.).





1 The estimation equation is formulated as follows: ln(Y)=µ+α1 ln(K)+α2 ln(L)+α3 MNCs[+α4 00D+α5 01D+α6 02D]+ε; Y is total
annual sales (million HUF).  K is total equity capital (million HUF).  L is annual average number of employees adjusted differences in
average work hours per employee based on Fazekas and Koltay (2003, pp. 216-217).  MNCs is a dummy of multinational corporations.  00D,
01D and 02D are year dummies. µ and αi are constant terms.  ε is an error term. MNCs is excluded when estimating fixed effects models and
random effects models.
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
1999 2000 2002
Fixed effects
 3 Random effects
1999-2002Chapter 2
Source: Népszabadság . 2003. Április 12., 5. o.
Notes: Figure for Hungary is in 2001.  Figures for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark
and Spain are in 1999.  Figures for the average of 15 EU nations and other countries are in 2000.












1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Author's illustration based on Table 1 and Table 9.
(1990=100)
National total number of R&D staffs
Total number of R&D staffs of enterprises
National total R&D expenditure
Total R&D expenditure by enterprises





























(Total expenditure to GDP: %)
 51Table 9.  Selected Indices of R&D Activities in Hungary and its
1990 1991 1992 1993
Total staff number 36,384 29,397 24,192 22,609
in R&D institutions 14,524 11,909 10,235 9,164
in R&D units of higher education 8,843 8,458 7,917 7,776
in R&D units of enterprises 13,017 9,030 6,040 5,669
Share of enterprise R&D staffs (%) 35.8 30.7 25.0 25.1
Total number of R&D units 1,256 1,257 1,287 1,380
R&D institutions 142 133 118 124
R&D units of higher education 940 1,000 1,071 1,078
R&D units of enterprises 174 124 98 178
Share of R&D units of enterprises (%) 13.9 9.9 7.6 12.9
Total R&D expenditure (HUF/million) 33,725 27,100 31,600 35,300
From state budget 18,108 9,100 11,000 12,000
From governmental funds 10,132 … … …
From other domestic sources 538 … … …
By international organizations 346 … … …
By enterprises 13,075 13,085 10,921 9,891
Share of R&D expenditure by enterprises (%) 38.8 48.3 34.6 28.0
Total R&D expenditure to GDP (%) 1.6 1.6 1.1 1.0
Total number of patent applications … … … 12,779
By Hungarian residents …………
By non-Hungarian residents …………
Total number of patent registrations … … … 1,409
By Hungarian residents …………
By non-Hungarian residents …………
Source: Compiled by the author based on KSH, Magyar Statistikai Évköny  and Kutatás és Fejlesz-
(2002, p. 23).
52Corporate Sector, 1990-2002
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
22,008 19,585 19,776 20,758 20,315 21,329 23,534 22,942 23,703
8,343 7,739 9,080 8,866 7,815 7,978 8,204 7,766 7,979
7,611 6,310 6,558 7,210 7,561 7,452 8,859 8,397 8,528
6,054 5,536 4,138 4,682 4,939 5,899 6,471 6,779 7,196
27.5 28.3 20.9 22.6 24.3 27.7 27.5 29.5 30.4
1,401 1,442 1,461 1,679 1,725 1,887 2,020 2,337 2,426
112 107 121 131 132 130 121 133 143
1,106 1,109 1,120 1,302 1,335 1,363 1,421 1,574 1,613
183 226 220 246 258 394 478 630 670
13.1 15.7 15.1 14.7 15.0 20.9 23.7 27.0 27.6
40,289 42,310 46,027 63,591 71,186 78,188 105,388 140,605 171,470
14,700 19,975 20,562 31,992 35,305 37,518 48,170 75,386 100,392
… 3,302 2,996 2,862 3,625 4,106 4,037 4,591 6,455
… 1,744 3,172 2,929 2,022 2,131 2,189 3,317 2,441
… 1,997 2,076 2,655 3,375 4,363 11,202 12,918 17,773
10,096 11,563 17,221 23,153 26,859 30,070 39,790 48,984 50,864
25.1 27.3 37.4 36.4 37.7 38.5 37.8 34.8 29.7
0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
17,039 20,887 24,979 30,105 38,707 44,974 62,438 83,021 89,327
1,178 1,117 832 774 751 787 881 919 842
15,861 19,770 24,147 29,331 37,956 44,187 61,557 82,102 88,485
1,144 1,910 1,030 1,189 1,257 1,881 1,605 1,306 1,555
536 534 352 346 263 300 176 … …
608 1,376 678 843 994 1,581 1,429 … …
-  tés  (various years), information available at the WIPO website (http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/) and Havas
53Chapter 2
Source: Nikodémis (2003, 41. o.).
Figure 4. Share of Foreign Companies in Corporate R&D
Expenditure  by Country, 1996-1998




























100% domestically-owned enterprise 1,230 669 1,169 3,068 373 3,441 19,375 22,816
Enterprise with foreign participation
 1 279 122 255 656 56 712 1,368 2,080
100% foreign-owned enterprise 123 40 118 281 62 343 1,256 1,599
Total 1,632 831 1,542 4,005 491 4,496 21,999 26,495
100% domestically-owned enterprise 5.4 2.9 5.1 13.4 1.6 15.1 84.9 100.0
Enterprise with foreign participation
 1 13.4 5.9 12.3 31.5 2.7 34.2 65.8 100.0
100% foreign-owned enterprise 7.7 2.5 7.4 17.6 3.9 21.5 78.5 100.0
Total 6.2 3.1 5.8 15.1 1.9 17.0 83.0 100.0
Notes: 
1 Excluding 100% foreign-owned enterprises.














































enterprisesTable 11. Top 10 Export Commodities, 2002
1 Mobile communication devices 2,691,198 7.84 膢膢腚腚
2 Piston engine-type manufacturing 2,114,963 6.16 腚腚腚 ×
3 Passenger vehicles 1,481,180 4.31 腚腚膢 ×
4 Input/Output devices 766,262 2.23 膢膢腚腚
5 Parts for TV sets, radios and communication device 706,874 2.06 腚腚腚 ×
6 Computer memory devices 550,146 1.60 腚腚腚腚
7 TV sets 533,894 1.56 腚腚腚 ×
8 Video recorders 529,641 1.54 腚腚腚腚
9 Automatic data processing equipment/units 508,393 1.48 膢膢腚腚
10 Conductors 431,424 1.26 膢腚膢 ×
Total for 10 commodities 10,313,975 30.04 8.0 8.5 9.0 5.0





























Notes: 腚 indicates 'applicable', 腾 indicates 'not applicable' and 膢 indicates 'partially applicable'.  For the numerical estimate of the total for 10 commodities, each 腚
mark is given 1.0 point, 膢 mark 0.5 point and 腾 mark 0.0 point.1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total exports (million USD) 286.9 321.5 351.7 593.2 523.9 2,663.3 3,890.5 4,857.2 6,429.1 6,186.6 7,256.2
Year-on-year change (%) - 12.06 9.37 68.68 -11.67 408.32 46.08 24.85 32.36 -3.77 17.29
Shares in total exports (%) 2.68 3.61 3.26 4.60 3.98 13.91 16.88 19.39 22.85 20.29 21.13
Total imports (million USD) 1,001.3 1,145.6 1,416.7 1,394.0 1,607.2 2,745.7 3,419.8 4,368.5 6,283.7 6,850.3 7,593.0
Year-on-year change (%) - 14.41 23.67 -1.60 15.29 70.84 24.55 27.74 43.84 9.02 10.84
Share in total exports (%) 9.04 9.17 9.54 9.01 9.92 12.93 13.32 15.60 19.59 20.34 20.19
Trade balance (million USD) -714.4 -824.1 -1,065.1 -800.8 -1,083.2 -82.4 470.7 488.6 145.4 -663.6 -336.7















Fixed assets Sales Exports
Number of
employees
High-tech industries 10.4 80.5 91.5 97.5 66.5
Upper medium-tech industries 11.7 86.0 84.9 93.9 58.4
Lower medium-tech industries 10.7 74.6 71.6 73.7 42.5
Low-tech industries 8.2 58.3 57.0 71.8 36.3
Total 9.5 74.5 75.1 89.2 46.1
Source: Selected by the author from Hamar (2004, 48-49. o.).
Notes: The following industries are included in each sector.  (The numbers in parentheses are OECD
industrial classification codes.) High-tech industries: aircraft and spacecraft (35.3), pharmaceuticals (24.4),
office and computing machinery (30), communications equipment (32), and medical, precision and optical
instruments (33.1).  Upper medium-tech industries: electric machinery and apparatus (31), motor vehicles
(34), chemicals (excluding pharmaceuticals) (24 excl. 24.4), railway locomotives and other transport
equipment (35.2 + 35.4), general machinery and devices (29), Lower medium-tech industries:
manufactured fuels (coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel) (23), rubber and plastic products
(25), non-metallic mineral products (26), basic metals (27), fabricated metal products (28) and ships and
boats (35.1).  Low-tech industries: Food, beverages and tobacco (15 + 16), textiles, apparel and leather
products (17 + 18 + 19), wood products, paper products and printing (20 + 21 + 22), other manufacturing
Table 13. Shares of Foreign Companies in Manufacturing Sector by
Technological Level, 2001
 58Chapter 3 
The Characteristics of Corporate Capital 
Structure Decisions during the Transition 




3.1 Theoretical Approaches to Capital Structure Decisions 
The corporate capital structure decision, in spite of its ‘derived’ nature, has been in 
the focus of theoretical interest for decades. Its ‘derived’ character means that 
corporate managers rarely make capital structure decisions to achieve explicit 
optimum structure. The corporate managers make decisions on production, market and 
financing; the latter can directly affect the current corporate capital structure. In spite 
of its ‘derived’ nature, the decisions over capital structure belong to the most 
important management functions.   
  According to the traditional theory of capital structure, the weighted average 
cost of capital changes in a form of U shaped cost curve depending on leverage. 
Durand (1952), the most significant representative of this theory, assumed that the 
weighted average cost of capital at the minimum of the cost of capital defines the 
optimum capital structure, because the corporate value is maximized at the minimum 
of the average cost. The theoretical approach by Modigliani and Miller (1958) was the 
first to question the existence of a single optimum capital structure. With the 
assumption of no taxes Modigliani-Miller theory based on arbitrage logic was in line 
with Irving Fisher’s (1930) separation theory. In Irving Fisher’s view in a perfect and 
efficient capital market the production investment decisions are independent of the 
owners’ intertemporal consumption-saving decisions. In effect, it means that the Chapter 3 
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corporate profit-maximizing production investment decisions are not affected by the 
owner’s lending-borrowing decision, i.e. the production investment decision is 
independent of its financing decision. Since the possibility for arbitrage means that 
the ‘law of one price’ is temporarily violated, thus capital market actors can benefit 
from them. So, if we assumed that the corporate value of firms financed by different 
capital structures might vary, then this value would be offset by arbitrageurs’ 
transactions using these opportunities. Modigliani and Miller proved with this 
arbitrage argument that the corporate value is influenced by its cash flow generating 
potential and the firm’s value is independent of its financing structure. Taking taxes 
into consideration alters the essence of this approach; Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
came to the conclusion that if taxes are taken into consideration then the after-tax 
corporate value is increased by the net present value of tax savings. Due to the market 
imperfections and the fear of default, corporate managers are forced to limit their 
need for external financing. As the debt/total assets ratio increases, the probability of 
default on interest and principal payment to the creditors also increases. 
  The theoretical approach by Modigliani and Miller inspired concepts on 
capital structures; new theories have been developed for the past decades. This 
theoretical evolution gives way to two important implications. The first is that there is 
no unquestionable evidence that it is possible to define a single optimum capital 
structure for a firm; the second is that the foundation of corporate capital structure 
decisions cannot be explained by a single theoretical approach. The latter means that 
several, competing capital structure theories can have real relevance for the incentives 
concerning corporate capital structure. 
  The corporate financing decisions are a combination of owners’ equity and 
external debt in a certain proportion. Therefore, it is a natural corporate endeavor to 
use debt finance on a regular basis. The debt is not only the supplement for owners’ 
equity capital financing the firm, but also a resource with implications, which are 
advantageous for the decision makers. The interest payments on debt are deductible 
before tax, thus the fee for using debt capital makes tax savings possible. Therefore, 
the companies would increase their use of debt capital owing to the tax exemption for Chapter 3 
  61
the interest payment. Increasing the degree of debt capital bumps into the obstacle of 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), which can limit further indebtedness by 
narrow interest coverage. The fear of financial distress or default is the protection 
against excessive continuation of corporate indebtedness process. 
  This concept is based on the trade-off theory for capital structure. According 
to this theory – first developed by Myers (1983) – assuming capital market 
equilibrium and behavior maximizing corporate value, the firms borrow funds up to a 
point when tax savings from further borrows are equal to the net present value of the 
costs of the potential financial distress. The trade-off theory for capital structure 
shows the choice between owners’ equity and external debt as a selection between the 
tax savings from interest tax exemption and the costs of financial distress. The 
representatives of this theory considered the moderate debt/total assets ratio 
something to be followed. The prudent corporate behavior preferred by Myers (1984) 
and Rajan and Zingales (1995) expresses not only the difficulty in defining the 
trade-off point, but also the consideration that the debt level not exceeding 50% 
serves as some protection against financial distress. It is a paradox for the capital 
structure theories and especially for the trade-off theory that the permanently 
profitable companies use the opportunity for leverage effect provided by the debt 
capital to the least extent. Permanently profitable companies could increase their 
debt/equity ratio continuously because the asset coverage and the interest coverage by 
the EBIT would provide enough guarantees. This capital structure behavior by 
permanently profitable companies means that this concept cannot be explained by the 
trade-off theory for capital structure. So the profitable company does not go as far as 
the limit where the tax saving advantages exceed the potential costs of financial 
distress. The trade-off theory is able to express the basic theoretical stream of capital 
structure behavior but less able to grasp the momentums valid for the masses of firms.   
  In corporate financing decisions the choice between equity capital and debt 
finance results in an inevitable conflict of interest between owners and creditors. The 
agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is based on the existence and 
management of this potential conflict. There is a conflict of interest between the Chapter 3 
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managers and the owners; the main reason behind is the information asymmetry. The 
capital structure theory based on the agency theory is centered on the information gap 
between managers and owners. Myers (1997) thinks that the more dynamic the 
increase in the corporate assets is, the more probable the conflict between the owners 
and creditors arises. This happens simply because a company can embark upon more 
and more risky projects to add value to the shareholders’ wealth at the expense of the 
creditors’ interests. Similarly, Jensen (1986) states that the managers make efforts to 
increase the company size while shareholders are interested in increasing the 
corporate value. 
  The basic consideration for capital structure theory based on the agency 
theory is that financing decision makers are informed on a different scale, and 
developing capital structure requires costs for all the participants. If necessary funds 
are raised by issuing shares, then timing of initial public offerings (IPO), security 
market pricing, market absorption, and the IPO effects on corporate value will turn 
into a conflict zone. Myers and Majluf (1984) pointed out that if managers have more 
information compared to the market actors and want to finance corporate investments 
by issuing shares, then the stock price will decrease, assuming all the other factors 
constant. In connection with corporate decision-making it has been an experience for 
several decades that the managers are prone to abuse their advantageous situation 
from information asymmetry. In decision making positions the managers know more 
about the real situation of the company, its future possibilities, riskiness, and real 
value than the external investors or creditors do. This advantage raises the issue of 
moral hazard in relation to certain decisions. 
  The agency theory of capital structure describes the financial fund allocation 
conflict, which coincides with costs. The more and more indebted company is 
menaced with financial distress and the potential chance for default, but controlling 
all these processes would require substantial monitoring costs. This is the area where 
the trade-off theory and the agency theory are combined. The return on tax exemption 
from borrowing debt is more and more offset by the potential and real costs from 
increased indebtedness. Both the trade-off theory and the agency theory state in Chapter 3 
  63
unison that the increase in debt ratio has a limit, which is hard to define. The agency 
theory is significant in determining the reasons for costs of information asymmetry 
beyond the conflict between the capital structure decision participants. The possibility 
for conflict between actors leads to alternating directions and results in the battle with 
the temporary prevalence of either the equity or the debt component. Neither the 
trade-off theory, nor the agency theory and nor their combination provide acceptable 
explanation for the choice of optimum capital structure. The tendencies for 
conflicting structure formations define an outcome of capital structure, but the next 
step, in general, is adjusted not to the assumed optimum, but to the corporate 
financing requirements, to the owners’ interests, and to the corporate growth needs. 
  The most practical capital structure theory is the pecking order theory, which 
provides guidelines to corporate capital structure decisions. Among the capital 
structure theories this one enjoys wide acceptance, and it covers the possibilities for 
choices of potential capital structure decisions to the most extent. It was Myers (1984) 
again who developed the essence of the pecking order theory. This theory describes 
the pecking order for corporate financing sources. In the theory the basic idea is that 
companies prefer their own internal funds to external financing sources when 
financing new investments. If retained earnings do not cover the financing 
requirements set by the investments, then cash and marketable securities are activated 
first; so companies postpone borrowing or issuing shares. First, the company can 
issue bonds, then convertible bonds, and, in the end, shares.  The pecking order 
theory is based on the corporate consideration that if the firm has exhausted its 
internally generated sources and it still has advantageous investment opportunities, 
then the latter may be financed by external funds. One of the most significant building 
blocks in this theory recognizes that the effort to increase equity capital as internal 
source stands at the end of the pecking order chain. It can be explained by the 
riskiness of issuing new equity due to information asymmetry. In a financing 
environment where not all of the investors have access to the relevant information on 
a company, the intention to issue new equity may have negative signaling effect to the 
investors. Consequently, a company raises funds in this way because it has not got Chapter 3 
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enough internal capital, and the negative reaction by investors may result in falling 
stock prices. 
  The managers are better informed compared to the owner-investors, this idea 
reflects the same asymmetry we have seen at the fundamentals of the agency theory. 
Growth companies adjust their decision on dividend payments to the existence or 
non-existence of profitable investments when determining the use of realized profit. If 
the retained earnings with planned amount exceed the financing requirements set by 
advantageous investment opportunities, the companies will increase the level of their 
current assets or pay substantial dividends. Both the dividend payment and equity 
issue give signals to the actors in the capital market. The potential investors might 
consider the dividend payment the lack of profitable investment projects at the 
moment, which does not necessarily serve the purpose of adding value to the 
shareholders’ wealth. They might come to the conclusion that the new equity issue 
would finance promising projects or it might show disturbances in raising funds for 
the company. 
  After covering the theoretical basics there are no doubts left about the 
complementary nature of the trade-off theory, the agency theory and the pecking order 
theory in the capital structure decisions, and about their competitiveness with one 
another. Further on, the specific characteristics for financing assets in transition 
economies will be analyzed. 
 
3.2 The Characteristics of Capital Structure Decisions in the 
Economic Transition Period 
 
In the emerging market economies the corporate capital structure decisions can be 
explained by the above-mentioned theories, but many authors draw our attention to 
several specific features concerning the emerging economies. Csermely and Vince 
(2000), Csermely (1996) came to the similar conclusions that in these economies 
companies do not face the same opportunities for financing choices as these could in 
highly developed economies. Chapter 3 
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  From very beginning of economic transition, the heritage of asset-finance 
from the socialist planned economies has to be taken into account. During the decades 
prior to the transition period in the investment projects fixed assets were financed by 
funds from the state budget in large proportions, and current assets were covered by 
bank loans. Although, over the years the rate of internal corporate capital sources 
reached a higher extent, but their prevalence in total investments appeared during the 
decades prior to the transitions. During this period, bank loans were assigned to 
projects supported by the state budget, but in a period of not market economy 
regulations the determining role of ‘coverage principle’ remained valid. Galai and 
Masulis (1976), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) stated unanimously that higher fixed asset ratio in the capital structure 
provides better guarantee for the approval of bank loans. According to these authors, 
companies can have better chances to access bank loans at a higher fixed asset ratio. 
  From the onset the economic transition was financed with capital structure 
significantly different from that of highly developed economies. To highlight the main 
differences it is worth referring to the relative shortage of financing sources, the 
complete lack of capital markets as possibilities for raising funds, and the heavy 
reliance on financing from internal funds. In the early phase of economic transition 
masses of corporate defaults increased the lending risk for the commercial banks. 
Another negative effect on the potential lending came from the extremely short saving 
time horizon in this period. The majority of the savings deposited in the banks lapsed 
within a couple of months, which explains the lack of long term financing sources. 
Issuing debt or equity in the capital markets was marginal not only in the early phase 
of transition but also later on. The internal financing sources from depreciation and 
retained earnings proved to be noteworthy in their importance. The internal corporate 
sources represented great significance in the early period despite of the low level of 
corporate profit after tax during the transition crisis due to several reasons. Beyond 
the natural productivity and market disturbances concomitant with the transition 
period, the fact that companies had to cover several costs explicitly tied to the 
developing market economy played a role in the low profitability. Chapter 3 
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  The study by Booth at al. (2001) is one of the most comprehensive researches 
in the corporate capital structure in market economies both in transition and 
developing countries. The most important remark by the authors is that the ratio of 
long-term liabilities in the capital structure is much lower in the observed economies 
as opposed to that of the companies in the highly developed countries. Identifying this 
very important characteristic leads to further issues. The first one is that in emerging 
market economies the long term liabilities per total assets should be distinguished 
from short term plus long term liabilities per total assets ratio. The main reason for 
the clear distinction between the two ratios is to approach the true value of the capital 
structure ratio in a more refined way. We can establish an assumption that the 
short-term liabilities in the newly emerging countries have an undeniable permanent 
liability component, which is hard to define in an exact way. The second issue is 
related to the violation of the maturity matching principle. In the transition economies 
a certain portion of the permanent assets were financed with short-term liabilities due 
to the lack of long-term debt. The mass appearance of this aggressive financing 
approach is one of the most important financing experiences in the economic 
transition. 
  The relatively low debt level is an indication that masses of companies do not 
use the advantages of financial leverage. The lower leverage is owing to both supply 
and demand reasons. The decreasing saving rate, the high risk in banking, and the 
substantial transaction costs restrain lending activity. Beside the supply side the 
demand is also important. Companies refrain from borrowing because of the fear of 
financial distress, high costs of capital, and the fact that creditworthy companies are 
less in need of external financing and companies eager for external debt capital 
achieve lower credit scores in banking. Beyond the relative scarcity of bank loans, the 
access to the bond financing possibilities remained narrow. The average profitability 
on investment projects is exceeded by the costs incurred during an initial public 
offering. Issuing shares by production firms has been very rare for a decade. 
  The weight of internal corporate sources increased due to the relative 
shortage of external funds, the relative lack of highly developed capital markets, and Chapter 3 
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the increased lending risk; as a result, this component in the capital structure has been 
playing a permanent determining role in financing corporate assets. The dominance of 
retained earnings and depreciation just as well as the refrainment from equity finance 
has proved to provide the undoubted evidences for the implications of pecking order 
theory. The huge number of bankruptcies, the high risk in banking, and the fear of 
financial distress reinforced the assumption that the effects of several concepts from 
the agency theory can be traced. One of the most well known concepts in capital 
structure theories, i.e. the low debt capital ratio coupled with high profitability cannot 
be proved. The concept related to mature companies in developed economies is not 
valid for the corporate structures of firms in the emerging economies, because at the 
latter advantageous profitability is connected to good chance for growth potential, so 
the very profitable companies can grow by investments. 
  On a critical stance I have to state that the dominant weight of corporate 
internal funds and financing long term assets with short-term liabilities can rather be 
viewed as forced capital structure decisions than as the realization of possibilities 
from the freedom of choice. These characteristics determined the financing 
frameworks for economic transition and structural modernization. The foreign direct 
investment, loans provided by the international parent companies, internal funds, and 
realized profit played the main role in the mass restructuring of firms. Debt capital 
from banks and the capital market was less important in the structural transition. 
Beside the relative scarcity of sources the ability to manage information asymmetry 
was also lacking in the capital and money markets. 
  During the economic transition the parallel shrinking reach of financial 
intermediaries influenced the corporate capital structure decisions. The essence of 
this process was that commercial banks and capital markets had weaker positions in 
pooling savings and converting them to credit. Disintermediation reflects the more 
and more intense flow of funds from savers towards insurance companies and mutual 
funds, thus the savings level in commercial banks decreased significantly.  The 
permanent decline in lending long-term loans had both supply and demand causes. It 
is not only about that the companies refrain from borrowing permanent capital but Chapter 3 
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also the supply by commercial banks was quite scarce. During the early phase of the 
economic transition this tendency was especially strong since the average maturity of 
savings hardly exceeded one year for a long time. Later the deposit time increased, 
but this change did not influence the weight of long term lending in the capital 
structure significantly. 
 
3.3 Summary of Theoretical Implications 
The theoretical approaches as the base for corporate capital structure decisions seem 
to be complementary to one another, rater than being competitive with one another. 
One reason for this is that the assumptions and conclusions of capital structure 
theories partially overlap one another, while the other is that the corporate practical 
capital structure decisions and their implications cannot be described with the help of 
one single theoretical approach. It also means that there is no universal capital 
structure theory, of which different alternatives for corporate decisions could be 
derived. Another important conclusion after covering the theoretical background is 
that theoretically an optimum capital structure valid for every company cannot be 
found. Every approach observed so far covers parts in the complexity of capital 
structure decisions, so the relevant factors related to decisions are suitable for partial 
explanations. If we examine the relationships between company size, operating 
profitability, growth, risk, assets composition and capital structure, then we can find 
strong positive or negative correlations, but we also find examples for loose 
relationships. Our main conclusion is that in economics the capital structure does not 
have a universal impact embodied by cost, income or profit; and in corporate 
decisions based on theory the sectoral and corporate characteristics have major role. 
 
3.4 The Characteristics of Capital Structure Decisions in the 
Hungarian Transitional Economy 
 
Management decisions concerning capital structure are of major importance and it is 
also true for the Hungarian experience during the economic transition. Corporate Chapter 3 
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capital management decisions are pivotal in determining to what extent the equity 
capital is complemented by short and long term liabilities. Capital markets determine 
greatly the degree of freedom left for management decisions, and also influence 
access to financing sources, managers’ decision-time horizon, risk taking ability, 
ability to use financial leverage, and other factors. 
  The study of Hungarian capital structure experiences was based on data on 
manufacturing companies for the period between 1992 and 2001. By way of analyzing 
these corporate data, I try to understand to what extent corporate capital structure 
changed over those ten years of the economic transition, and how the established 
ratios are identical or different from the characteristics of capital structure theories. 
An additional question I raise is that which theoretical approaches comply the most 
with Hungarian corporate capital structure decisions. The results of the study of 
corporate data lead to stunning findings concerning basic issues. According to the 
basic definition, the capital structure is the ratio of long-term liabilities to long-term 
assets. The aforementioned data show that in the case of Hungarian companies during 
the whole period of the transition to market economy, we can rather address the 
characteristics of financing structure than that of capital structure. Of course, we 
would exaggerate by stating that capital structure problems cannot be discussed at all, 
yet we must declare that the weight of long-term funds in the external debt capital is 
negligible, and it is the weight of short-term liabilities that is crucial. The explanation 
for why we do not consider the long-term debt component the exclusive corporate 
external debt element is that, according to our assumption, short-term funds have a 
permanent component. This way the proportion of long-term external capital can be 
more significant than shown above. As derived from the available statistical data it is 
impossible to show the permanent element of short-term funds, but assuming its 
existence is well founded. This characteristic of the corporate fund structure means 
that if masses of corporations violate the maturity-matching principal, then the 
permanent assets financed with either long-term funds or short-term liabilities should 
be distinguished in the analysis of capital structure. We are obviously aware that 
financing long-term assets with short-term funds does not mean that these turn into Chapter 3 
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long-term liabilities. Mentioning a permanent component refers to an aggressive 
financing approach with an element in short-term funds which finance permanent 
assets as supplementary function. During the period 1992-2001 there were significant 
changes in the corporate capital structure of the manufacturing industries. In the first 
half of the period equity capital dominated the capital structure in most industrial 
sectors. Metallurgy and the steel industry proved to be exceptions, where that debt 
ratio was 60% from the start. Concerning the majority of industrial sectors we can 
state that the proportion of external capital did not exceed 40% in the early years. 
Later this ratio declined even further in the textile, leather and clothing industries, 
and never exceeded 30% (see Figures 1-10). In the second half of the period the debt 
ratio increased substantially in the majority of industries, reaching 50%. The structure 
of external capital reflects huge inner differences, because the proportion of 
long-term funds in it is extremely low. If we take the ratio of permanent funds to total 
assets into consideration, then we get values ranging between 5% and 10% throughout 
the period under scrutiny. As explanation we can refer to the theoretical part. 
Long-term lending by commercial banks was scarce during this period, and the 
lending risks for banks were disproportionately high. Companies could only have 
access to permanent funds at extremely high costs of capital, and the majority of those 
companies requiring external capital did not meet the strict credit rating requirements. 
Beside the exaggerated prudence of commercial banks, the capital market fund raising 
channels were not established either. On the whole - issuing, purchasing and trading 
of corporate bonds was rare during the period. Neither corporate nor government 
investments were financed with long-term bonds to a perceivable degree. As an 
additional remark, it is important to note that individuals considered these securities 
increasingly risky investments, and they refrained from buying them. Figures 11-18 
depict these significant differences in capital structure ratios. The figures illustrate 
that the already low proportion of long-term capital declined further in certain periods 
in most sectors (textile, leather, clothing, chemical, construction and heavy machine 
industries). 
  Hungarian corporate experiences show that the trade-off theory of corporate Chapter 3 
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capital structure does not provide sufficient grounds to explain corporate decisions. 
The tax exemption of interest payments did not widely encourage companies to 
borrow more debt capital, because due to the low profitability many companies did 
not pay taxes for a long time, companies with foreign majority of ownership enjoyed 
tax shelters, and they received loans from their parent companies. The agency theory 
provides further explanations for the motivations behind corporate decisions. The 
high lending risks of banks, the threat of corporate bankruptcies, and the significant 
monitoring costs of indebted companies prove the relevance of this theory. Before 
mentioning further arguments, we can even now assume that the pecking-order theory 
is able to characterize the Hungarian corporate capital structures in the most 
comprehensive and authentic way. The significant proportion of internal funds, the 
marginal role of raising funds in capital markets, and the low proportion of long-term 
liabilities support this assumption. 
  If we scrutinize capital structure based on corporate ownership we experience 
noteworthy differences. Tables 1-5 show the differences between capital structures of 
ownership with foreign majority and those with domestic ownership. By the end of 
the period in the capital structure of foreign ownership there is almost twice as much 
long-term funds. This difference might refer to the better fund-raising opportunities 
within the reach of companies with foreign ownership (credits from parent 
companies), the advantages of higher asset coverage, better solvency, and higher 
willingness to take risks. The aggregate average and standard deviation values of 
manufacturing company data show that with time there was a tendency for the weight 
of long-term funds to increase. These tables also indicate that retained profits played 
a marginal role in the internally generated components of internal funds. The after-tax 
return on total assets does not exceed 1% annually on a permanent basis for the 
majority of companies. It means that among internal funds owners’ equity and 
realized depreciation could have the major importance. In this respect there is no 
significant difference between the investing ability of companies with domestic or 
foreign majority of ownership. The very low return on assets draws our attention to 
the lack of internal accumulating ability among masses of companies. The standard Chapter 3 
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deviation around the average for this ratio refers to a continuing capital consumption 
in the case of many companies. 
  Since the short-term sources have important role in the liabilities side of the 
corporate balance sheets, additional remarks are necessary to the debt ratio around 
50%. As discussed above, we cannot argue that the corporate capital structures in 
Hungary are similar to the leverage ratios in the market economies. This structure is a 
forced choice under the pressure of external circumstances. I have to emphasize again 
that among factors influencing capital structure there is not a single one, which could 
operate satisfactorily meeting market economy requirements. The long-term lending 
activity by commercial banks is extremely low, companies hardly ever issue bonds, 
and only a small number of firms can be profitable up to a point where internally 
generated funds can serve the purpose of leverage. Consequently, it means that firms 
with ownership of foreign majority can have access to long-term funds with good 
chances through long-term loans from parent companies and equity finance. In the 
case of several companies as short-term liabilities reach maturity; these sources are 
renewed from year to year behaving as permanent financing sources. 
  There is no ground to assume that these financing problems can only be 
attributed to the external capital part of the corporate balance sheet. At the beginning 
of economic transition the equity prevalence in raising funds was due to the 
securitization of earlier accumulated corporate wealth and not to the mass mobility of 
free capital. The only exceptions were the companies targeted by foreign direct 
investment. The majority of companies had difficulties in raising new equity similarly 
as in using debt financing. The permanently high cost of capital of short-term 
liabilities played a very important role in the low level of retained earnings in the 
corporate profits after-tax. 
  Further research is required to clarify to what extent industrial segment, 
ownership, asset structure, company size, and operating profit contribute to the 
capital structure development. Another further question to address is the analysis of 
how the short-term orientation in the liabilities sides of the corporate balance sheets 
affects liquidity and growth potential. Chapter 3 
  73
References 
Booth, L., V. Aivazian, A. Demirguc – Kunt & V. Maksimovic, ‘Capital Structures in 
Developing Countries,’ Journal of Finance, February, 56, 1, 2001, pp. 87-130. 
Cornelli, F., R. Portes & M. E. Schaffer, The Capital Structure of Firms in Central and 
Eastern Europe. (CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 1392) (London: CEPR, 1996).  
Csermely, Á. & J. Vincze, ‘Leverage and Foreign Ownership in Hungary,’ Russian and 
East European Finance and Trade, 3, 2000, pp. 6-30. 
Csermely, Á., Enterprise Financing by Banks in Hungary 1991-1994. (Working Papers 
Series of National Bank of Hungary 1996/6) (Budapest: National Bank of Hungary, 
1996). 
DeAngelo, H. & R. Masulis, ‘Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and Personal 
Taxation,’ Journal of Financial Economics, 8, 1, 1980, pp. 3-29. 
Fisher, I., The Nature of Capital and Interest. (New York: Macmillan, 1906). 
Durand, D., ‘Cost of Debt and Equity Funds for Business: Trends and Problems of 
Measurement,’ in NBER Conference on Research on Business Finance. (NBER, 1952), 
pp. 215-247. 
Galai, D. & R. W. Masulis, ‘The Option Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock,’ 
Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 1-2, 1976, pp. 53-81   
Jensen, M. C., ‘Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,’ 
American Economic Review, 76, 2, 1986, pp. 323-339. 
Miller, M. H., ‘Debt and Taxes,’ Journal of Finance, 32, 2, 1977, pp. 261-275. 
Modigliani, F. & M. H. Miller, ‘Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares,’ 
Journal of Business, 34, 4, 1961, pp. 411-433. 
Modigliani, F. & M. H. Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and Theory of 
Investment,’ American Economic Review, 48, 3, 1958, pp. 261-297. 
Modigliani, F. & M. H. Miller, ‘Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital,’ 
American Economic Review, 53, 3, 1963, pp. 433-443. 
Modigliani, F. & M. H. Miller, ‘Debt, Dividend Policy, Taxes, Inflation and Market 
Valuation,’ Journal of Finance, 37, 2, 1982, pp. 255-273. 
Myers, S. C., ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,’ Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 
2, 1977, pp. 147-175. 
Myers, S. C., ‘The Capital Structure Puzzle,’ Journal of Finance, 39, 3, 1984, pp. 
575-592. 
Myers, S. C. & N. S. Majluf, ‘Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms 
Have Information that Investors Do Not Have,’ Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 2, Chapter 3 
  74
1984, pp. 187-221. 
Rajan, R. G. & L. Zingales, ‘What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































STL/TASource: Estimated and illustrated by the author.
80
Chapter 3
















































LTL/TASource: Estimated and illustrated by the author.
81
Chapter 3





































LTL/TASource: Estimated and illustrated by the author.
82
Chapter 3














































LTL/TASource: Estimated and illustrated by the author.
Chapter 3
83









































Long-term Liabilities 282 1675 65 181 457 n.a.
Short-term Liabilities 829 2781 480 1078 1109 3587
Equity 1896 n.a. 884 1801 2709 n.a.
Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets (%) 70 14.2 50 10.4 8.7 16.5
Equity/Total Assets (%) 54.4 29.6 54.7 26.1 54.6 32.2
Depreciation/Investment (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Debt/Total Assets (%) 45.6 26.0 45.3 26.0 45.4 27.0
Profit after Taxes/Total Assets 0.013 0.21 0.036 0.13 -0.004 0.26










Long-term Liabilities 329 1550 91 262 517 2046
Short-term Liabilities 931 2942 539 1447 1242 3698
Equity 2014 12879 971 1862 2843 17146
Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets (%) 8.7 13.4 6.5 10.8 10.4 15.0
Equity/Total Assets (%) 55.9 24.8 55.7 24.3 56.1 25.2
Depreciation/Investment (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Debt/Total Assets (%) 44.1 0.23 44.3 0.24 0.4 22.0
Profit after Taxes/Total Assets 0.17 0.11 0.03 9.53 0.01 0.13
Short-term Liabilities Ratio (%) 35.4 23.8 37.8 22.9 33.5 24.2
Source: Estimated by the author.
Total Companies (422) Domestic Companies (188) Foreign Companies (234)























Long-term Liabilities 383 1755 113 309 600 2320
Short-term Liabilities 1103 2933 597 1423 1509 3680
Equity 2172 12827 996 1843 3117 17102
Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets (%) 9.8 16.3 7.0 11.0 12.0 19.2
Equity/Total Assets (%) 50.4 25.3 51.1 24.0 49.9 26.3
Depreciation/Investment (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Debt/Total Assets (%) 49.6 24.0 48.9 24.0 50.1 25.0
Profit after Taxes/Total Assets 0.028 0.14 0.03 7.9 0.02 0.18










Long-term Liabilities 454 2295 113 283 727 3044
Short-term Liabilities 1537 4780 694 1433 2211 6208
Equity 2591 n.a. 1124 2019 3765 n.a.
Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets (%) 9.3 23.1 6.4 9.3 11.1 29.7
Equity/Total Assets (%) 49.7 31.4 51.8 24.1 48.7 36.2
Depreciation/Investment (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Debt/Total Assets (%) 56.3 31.0 48.2 24.0 51.3 35.0
Profit after Taxes/Total Assets 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.22
Short-term Liabilities Ratio (%) 41.0 21.9 41.8 24.1 40.2 20.1
Source: Estimated by the author.
Total Companies (458) Domestic Companies (204) Foreign Companies (254)























Long-term Liabilities 608 n.a. 667 n.a. 952 n.a.
Short-term Liabilities 1987 n.a. 1852 n.a. 2808 n.a.
Equity 2963 n.a. 2179 n.a. 4333 n.a.
Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets (%) 10.5 37.3 5.9 n.a. 14.1 49.1
Equity/Total Assets (%) 42.7 83.2 43.2 106.0 43.0 59.2
Depreciation/Investment (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Debt/Total Assets (%) 57.3 82.9 56.8 106.0 57.0 58.4
Profit after Taxes/Total Assets 0.05 0.32 0.04 0.41 0.06 0.19










Long-term Liabilities 683 3963 222 806 1048 5234
Short-term Liabilities 2667 8624 1205 2322 3826 11237
Equity 3887 17124 1489 2283 5789 22802
Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets (%) 11.2 58.4 6.2 7.6 15.2 77.8
Equity/Total Assets (%) 47.8 68.9 51.8 19.3 43.8 90.0
Depreciation/Investment (%) 38.1 330.5 50.8 478.3 28.4 139.8
Debt/Total Assets (%) 52.2 68.0 48.2 19.0 56.2 89.0
Profit after Taxes/Total Assets 0.08 0.19 0.09 0.102 0.08 0.25
Short-term Liabilities Ratio (%) 41.0 21.0 42.0 18.2 41.0 23.0
Source: Estimated by the author.

























Long-term Liabilities 916 6008 298 1052 1410 7978
Short-term Liabilities 3272 10085 1348 2429 4811 13165
Equity 4952 22027 1728 2554 7531 29233
Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets (%) 11.3 53.1 7.1 9.4 14.7 70.7
Equity/Total Assets (%) 45.1 63.7 49.9 18.2 43.3 84.0
Depreciation/Investment (%) 87.0 615 143.6 876.5 42.6 264
Debt/Total Assets (%) 53.3 62.0 50.1 17.0 56.7 82.0
Profit after Taxes/Total Assets 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.1 0.08 0.17










Long-term Liabilities 1143 n.a. 328 1245 1793 n.a.
Short-term Liabilities 4116 n.a. 1655 2769 6078 n.a.
Equity 5956 n.a. 2002 3552 9108 n.a.
Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets (%) 9.1 10.5 6.7 7.4 11.0 12.1
Equity/Total Assets (%) 48.8 17.7 51.8 16.2 48.0 18.8
Depreciation/Investment (%) 29.1 189.2 36.3 234 23.5 144.6
Debt/Total Assets (%) 51.2 173.3 48.2 16.1 52.0 18.2
Profit after Taxes/Total Assets 0.07 0.102 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.11
Short-term Liabilities Ratio (%) 42.1 16.2 41.5 15.1 41.0 17.0
Source: Estimated by the author.
Total Companies (477) Domestic Companies (212) Foreign Companies (265)























Long-term Liabilities 1225 3567 532 1754 1575 4155
Short-term Liabilities 5657 n.a. 2519 3269 7245 n.a.
Equity 7260 29390 3056 5210 9388 35713
Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets (%) 9.7 11.1 6.5 6.9 11.3 12.4
Equity/Total Assets (%) 46.5 17.3 47.0 15.8 45.0 17.9
Depreciation/Investment (%) 65.8 620.2 70.8 483 63.4 677
Debt/Total Assets (%) 53.5 16.0 50.9 0.15 55.0 17.0
Profit after Taxes/Total Assets 0.07 9.37 0.07 6.72 0.07 0.1










Long-term Liabilities 1507 n.a. 400 1181 2388 n.a.
Short-term Liabilities 6848 n.a. 2434 3743 10366 n.a.
Equity 8112 n.a. 2619 4640 12410 n.a.
Long-term Liabilities/Total Assets (%) 9.3 11.2 6.1 7.1 11.9 13.1
Equity/Total Assets (%) 46.8 17.9 49.0 16.3 46.6 19.1
Depreciation/Investment (%) 110 1976 236.0 2983 12.4 29.4
Debt/Total Assets (%) 53.2 0.2 52.0 0.16 53.4 18.0
Profit after Taxes/Total Assets 0.05 n.a. 0.06 8.8 0.05 0.1
Short-term Liabilities Ratio (%) 43.9 16.6 45.9 15.4 41.5 17.3















Domestic Companies (126) Foreign Companies (249)
Total Companies (478) Domestic Companies (212) Foreign Companies (266)